

MULTIPLE SELF-PRESENTATIONS AND THE RESILIENCY OF THE SELF

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This dissertation is dedicated to Anita,
who eased my doubts and fears with her
warmth, understanding, and love.

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This study examined the effects of single and multiple self-presentations on self-ratings of sociability. Subjects were asked to play the role of a job applicant in videotaped, simulated job interviews and were instructed to present themselves in a sociable, accurate, or unsociable manner. Following a single, unsociable self-presentation, subjects increased their self-ratings of sociability in an attempt to reaffirm their threatened self-image. This boomerang effect was eliminated when subjects performed a second presentation that was either sociable or accurate. Further evidence of reaffirmation following an initial, unsociable presentation was found as subjects perceived a sociable, second presentation to be more representative of their true selves, and gave extremely sociable second presentations when instructed to be accurate.

These results indicate that, due to active refutation of self-threatening information, the self-concept may be more resistant to change than has previously been suggested.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The self is the product of social interaction. This belief, first expressed by William James (1890) and later expanded upon by Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934), has generated a significant body of literature and research in the fields of sociology and social psychology. The present paper focuses on one of the research programs derived from this basic belief and traces the history of this program from James to the present.

In the last 25 years, several researchers have demonstrated that our presentations to others influence how we feel about ourselves. These effects have been found to occur across a variety of self-beliefs and in a number of different situational contexts. To date, all of this research has involved a single presentation followed by an immediate assessment of the actor's self-beliefs. No attempt has been made to more closely approximate en vivo social interaction by exploring the impact of multiple presentations on self-beliefs. The present study represents the first step in this direction.

Literature Review

The study of the self was very popular when the science of psychology was in its infancy. William James (1890) devoted a 111-page chapter of The principles of psychology to "The Consciousness of Self" and introspective musings about the nature of the self were the cornerstones of theories developed by Freud and Jung. However, as the young science struggled to gain legitimacy and behaviorism began to dominate the field, the philosophical and often subjective early writings on the self became less influential and interest in the study of the self decreased.

In recent years, as the study of social cognition has gained popularity, the self has re-emerged as a hot topic and is currently one of the primary areas of social psychological research. With this renewed interest in the self has come a renewed interest in the early writings on the topic, many of which are still inspiring new theories and research. Given the current importance and impact of these early theories, a brief discussion of some of the more influential works follows. While this is by no means intended to be a complete or thorough review of the history of the self in social psychology, it should provide an adequate foundation for the discussion of self-presentation and self-concept change that follows.

Historical Perspectives

Many authors agree that the line of development of the self within social psychology begins with William James. James defined the self broadly as the sum total of all a man can call his

(1890/1952, p.188). He divided the self into two classes: the pure ego and the empirical self.

James conceptualized the pure ego as a "certain portion of the stream [of thoughts] abstracted from the rest . . . felt by all men as a sort of innermost centre within the circle, of sanctuary within the citadel" (1890/1952, p. 192). This portion of the stream of consciousness is the "present judging Thought" which knows and adopts all thoughts that went before and stands as the representative of the entire past stream (1890/1952, p.218). It is the active element of consciousness that seems to welcome or reject other thoughts and feelings.

That Thought is a vehicle of choice as well as of cognition; and among the choices it makes are these appropriations, or repudiations, of its "own." But the Thought never is an object in its own hands, it never appropriates or disowns itself. It appropriates to itself, it is the actual focus of accretion, the hook from which the chain of past selves dangles, planted firmly in the Present . . . Anon the hook itself will drop into the past with all it carries, and then be treated as an object and appropriated by a new Thought in the new present which will serve as living hook in turn. (p.219).

James believed that while we can become aware of the existence of the pure ego we cannot know about it until it has passed on and been appropriated by a new "present Thought" (p.219). Once it has been appropriated it can be viewed as an object and we can learn about it as a portion of what James called the empirical self.

James appeared to be much more intrigued by the pure ego while he spent relatively little time discussing the empirical self.

He defined the empirical self as all that a person is tempted to call by the name of "me." When we ask ourselves "Who am I?" the answers we give are components of the empirical self. While these components may differ in the degree of their association with the self and strength of the emotions they arouse, James believed that they all affect one in much the same way: "If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down . . ." (p. 188). James divides the components of the empirical self into three categories: the material self, the social self, and the spiritual self.

The material self consists of our body, clothes, immediate family, house, and possessions. Our possessions are more important and central to our sense of self when they are the product of personal labor.

The social self is the recognition a person receives from others. According to James, people have an intense, innate desire to be noticed favorably by others and this desire has little to do with the rational worth of such recognition. To accomplish this we present different social selves to different groups of people in an attempt to make a favorable impression. Thus, "Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind" (pp. 189-190). At first glance, this statement seems to indicate that James believed we have multiple selves rather than one, true self. However, James further explains that while we may present many slightly different selves, we experience them as one identical "Self" due to their resemblance in a fundamental respect, or their temporal

continuity. "Continuity makes us unite what dissimilarity might otherwise separate; similarity makes us unite what discontinuity might hold apart" (p.215). James illustrates the unifying effect of temporal continuity through the metaphor of "dissolving views." Dissolving views were similar to modern-day cartoons in that an illusion of unity and motion was created by flipping rapidly through a series of slightly different images. While any single image (self) frozen in time may be different from the others, when viewed as a part of the unbroken stream a sense of unity is created.

The final component of the empirical self--the spiritual self--is defined as "man's inner or subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions, taken concretely" (p.191). James argued that "these psychic dispositions are the most enduring and intimate part of the self, that which we most verily seem to be" and included among them "our ability to argue and discriminate, our moral sensibility and conscience, our indomitable will" (p.191). The spiritual self differs from the pure ego in that the pure ego is the active "thinker" while the spiritual self arises from reflectively thinking about ourselves as thinkers.

The distinction between the pure ego and the empirical self, first proposed by James (1890), is still popular in the current literature on the self. Greenwald and Pratkanis (1984) have developed a computer metaphor for the self which utilizes this distinction. They compare the pure ego to the computer program and the empirical self to the input and output or data. This type of process/content distinction has also been employed by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) who argue, as did James, that we have introspective

access to the outcomes of cognitive functioning (empirical self), but not to the process by which they are formed (pure ego). Greenwald and Pratkanis incorporate James' theory of introspective access into their computer metaphor by defining the pure ego (the program aspect of the computer metaphor) "as those aspects of cognitive function to which we do not have introspective access" (p.142). Since we cannot accurately assess introspective ability, "the boundary between mental process and content--like the boundary between computer program and data--is inherently fuzzy" (p.143). Greenwald and Pratkanis (1984) further argue that if psychologists had knowledge of memory and cognition as complete as computer programmers' knowledge of programming, the process/content distinction would disappear and the entire self could be viewed as an object. They propose that the dichotomy within the self experienced by many and described by James reflects a lack of understanding and not an actual division of the self. The aspects of the self which we understand and can describe are labeled the self-as-known, or the empirical self, while the aspects of self which we do not understand are labeled the self-as-knower, or pure ego.

Seymour Epstein (1973) recognized the utility of James' process/content distinction and incorporated it into his depiction of the self-concept as "a theory that the individual has unwittingly constructed about himself as an experiencing, functioning individual . . ." (p. 407). Like a scientific theory, the self-concept contains constructs which organize and classify certain facts, such as those pertaining to the material, social, and spiritual selves. These constructs are related to each other and to future events by sets of

hypotheses which are constantly being tested. The data may support our hypotheses and result in a strengthening of our self-theory, or they may fail to support our hypotheses and result in their rejection or modification, or the formation of auxiliary hypotheses to account for the findings. Through the formation and testing of hypotheses, the self-concept influences the acquisition of data and through the assimilation of new information, it is influenced by data. This view of the self-concept as a self-theory which is both the subject and the object of self-knowledge nicely captures James' distinction between the self-as-knower and the self-as-known.

With the publication of The principles of psychology in 1890, James decided he had said all that he knew about psychology and withdrew from the field to spend the remaining 20 years of his life as America's leading philosopher (Allen, 1967). In his absence, interest in the self within psychology waned. While behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and the Gestalt school dominated mainstream psychology, the study of the self in social life was continued largely by sociologists such as Cooley and Mead.

Charles Horton Cooley (1902) focused his discussion of the self on what James called the empirical self and completely ignored the " 'pure ego'--whatever that may be" (p.137). Cooley expressed his view of the self as a social entity by quoting Goethe: "Only in man does man know himself; life alone teaches each one what he is." (Tasso, act 2, scene 3). He denied the existence of a self which is not social stating: "There is no sense of 'I,' . . . without its correlative sense of you, or he, or they" (p. 151). Cooley proposed that the self develops largely by imagining how one appears in the

minds of others. He compared this process to that of viewing oneself in a looking-glass (mirror) and introduced the phrase, "looking-glass self." While this metaphor is the most often cited and well-known descriptor of his theory of self, Cooley noted that it does not quite capture the essence of the social self.

A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principle elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgement of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification. The comparison with a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgement, which is quite essential. The thing which moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another's mind . . . We always imagine, and in imagining share, the judgements of the other mind. (pp. 152-153).

We not only imagine others' judgements of our self, but in many situations the others themselves may exist only in our imagination. For Cooley, the "social" self may exist entirely within the mind of the individual as he or she displays a self and imagines the reaction of one or more internalized referents.

In tracing the development of the self in infants, Cooley explained that self-feelings "exist in a vague though vigorous form at the birth of each individual" (p. 139). He believed this initial self-feeling was an instinct which evolved due to its motivational and organizational importance to the individual. From this initial self-feeling, the looking-glass self begins to develop as the child becomes aware of the impact its behavior has on others and begins

to alter or manipulate its own behavior to obtain desired reactions from an audience. As the audiences for the child's performance change, "the young performer soon learns to be different things to different people . . ." (p. 165), indicating that the child is beginning to understand that others have unique and distinct selves which may be different from its own. The child identifies certain others as important and desires to interest and please them. Feedback from this group of important others has a great impact on the child's developing social self. As the child matures, it becomes less interested in the observable reaction of others and focuses instead on their "internal, invisible condition which his own richer experience enables him to imagine . . ." (p. 168). The child also becomes more subtle in its attempts to produce reactions in others. At first, the child's quest for positive regard from others is quite obvious and simple. In time the child begins to understand that such obvious approval seeking is censured by our society and its motives become less transparent.

For Cooley, the self arises through social interaction as individuals present different selves for different audiences, imagine the others' reactions to these presentations, and experience an affective response. The individual may then accept the imagined judgement of the other and alter its self-image accordingly, or more likely, it will protect its social self "by some sort of withdrawal [physical or mental] from the suggestions that agitate and harass it, or in the positive way, by contending with them and learning to control and transform them, so that they are no longer painful; most teachers inculcating some sort of combination of these two kinds of

tactics" (p. 219). As we shall see later, this process of social self-formation and change described by Cooley is central to the self-presentational theory of self-concept change.

Although he was contemporary with Cooley, George Herbert Mead's (1934) major work, Mind, self, and society, was published after his death; this accounts for the discrepancy in the dates of publication for Cooley and Mead. Working in the same historical time period, with many of the same issues, Mead approached the self in social life from a slightly different perspective than James or Cooley.

Mead (1934) defined the self as "that which can be an object to itself" and believed that "it arises in social experience" (p. 140). Mead's belief in the social genesis of the self is derived from his social behaviorist orientation.

For the self to become an object to itself, there must be a behavior which allows the individual to get outside himself, and a situation which necessitates such behavior (Mead, 1934). Mead explained that in social situations one must view oneself objectively, from the standpoints of the other interactants, in order to act intelligently or rationally. The behavior which allows one to do this is communication. In conversation with others, one makes a statement, listens to their response, and adjusts further statements on the basis of the reply. A more advanced form of communication is the internal conversation in which one says something, reacts to the statement by taking an objective point of view, and alters the statement due to this reaction. The importance of the internal

conversation to Mead's conception of the social self is illustrated by the following quote:

I know of no other form of behavior than the linguistic in which the individual is an object to himself, and, so far as I can see, the individual is not a self in the reflexive sense unless he is an object to himself. (p. 142).

Mead attempted to distinguish between the internalized conversation approach and what he criticized as the "internal and individual" (p. 224) psychology of Cooley. Cooley focused on imagining our appearance to others and their response to that appearance while Mead believed that we can take the other's point of view and objectively know what their response would be because of the universality of symbols of communication (i.e., language, gestures, facial expressions). Mead also criticized Cooley and James for their "endeavor to find the basis of the self in reflexive affective experiences, i.e., experiences involving 'self-feeling' . . ." (p. 173). For Mead, the essence of the self is cognitive and results from "the internalization and inner dramatization, by the individual, of the external conversation of significant gestures . . ." (p. 173). With his focus on the internal representation of external behavior Mead may be the earliest cognitive behaviorist.

Mead also differed with Cooley in his belief that the self is not present at birth, but develops through social experience within the existing social community. In describing the development of the self in young children, Mead identifies two key activities: play, and the game.

While playing, children often take the roles of others and play at being a teacher, a mother, or a policeman. Children may say something in one role and then respond to themselves by taking another role; however, at this level of development they move in and out of roles quickly and inconsistently with no unified conception of the relationships between roles. As a result, the self which develops is a loose organization of the internalized responses of particular others to each of the many roles the child may play and is necessarily fragmented and incomplete.

With the introduction of organized games, children must be ready to take the roles of all of the individuals involved in the game and understand how each of these roles are related to each other and to themselves. To accomplish this task, they develop what Mead called "the generalized other," which is an abstract generalization of the attitudes of all the other participants in the game, or more broadly, in the social community. Now, in addition to viewing themselves from the standpoint of particular others, children are able to view themselves from the standpoint of others in general. The internalized responses of the generalized other provide the self with the unity and stability previously lacking.

The mature self in Meadian terms is a product of one's internal conversations with particular others and, more importantly, with the generalized other. By viewing oneself objectively from the point of view of the specific and generalized others, a unified conception of self is formed and modified.

Symbolic Interactionist View of the Self-Concept

The work of Cooley and Mead led to the development of symbolic interactionism--a broad theoretical framework which has inspired much sociological and psychological research. The symbolic interactionists view all meaning, including the meaning of the self, as a product of the negotiation of reality which occurs in social interaction (Stryker & Statham, 1985). Participants in an interaction attempt to define the situation and each other through the exchange of shared symbols (e.g., language). Thus, the symbolic interactionists believe, as did Cooley and Mead, that the self arises from social experience as it is defined and redefined based on the responses of others.

The basic proposition of the symbolic interaction approach, that social interaction is necessary for the formation of the self, is difficult to test. A proper test of this hypothesis would require that the self-concepts of infants raised under conditions of complete social deprivation be compared to the self-concepts of infants raised under normal conditions. A comparison of this type was reported by Dennis (1960) who described an orphanage in Teheran where each child was kept in a separate, almost soundproof, cubicle and received little attention from caretakers. Virtually all of these children were severely mentally retarded despite having come almost exclusively from the literate population of Iran. Although this study may provide partial support for the symbolic interaction perspective, it does not directly test the necessity of social interaction for the development of the self for at least two reasons. First, Dennis made no attempt to directly assess self-concept

development among the orphans, and second, due to nonrandom assignment of infants to the orphanage, confounding factors such as prenatal care, abnormalities existing at birth, or child abuse may have contributed to the observed deficits. To control for these and other confounds, an experiment involving random assignment of infants to social deprivation conditions would be required. While such an experiment with human infants is out of the question, Gallup (1977) was able to conduct several studies of this type with primates.

Studies of self-recognition. The first step in Gallup's (1977) research was to demonstrate the existence of a self-concept in primates. Until this time most psychologists viewed the self as a uniquely human attribute, largely because they lacked a method for assessing the existence of a self in nonhumans. Gallup provided such a method using what he termed "mirror-image stimulation," in which he confronted animals with their reflections in a mirror. Most animals, when faced with their mirror image, behave as if they are seeing another animal and engage in other-directed social responses. Even after prolonged exposure they fail to comprehend the relationship between their behavior and their reflection and they never learn to use the mirror for grooming, self-inspection, or other self-directed behaviors (Gallup, 1968). However, Gallup (1970) discovered that the great apes (chimpanzees and orangutans) do have the capacity for self-recognition. When exposed to a full-length mirror for 10 days, preadolescent chimpanzees initially exhibited other-directed behaviors; but after the first two days the number of other-directed responses declined rapidly and were replaced by a

self-directed orientation (Gallup, 1970). The chimps began to use the mirror to pick food from their teeth and groom parts of their bodies which they could not see directly. Although Gallup concluded that these results demonstrated self-recognition in chimpanzees, he conducted a second, more carefully controlled study to strengthen his conclusions. Following the 10th day of mirror exposure, each chimp was anesthetized and marked with bright red, odorless, nonirritating dye on parts of their faces which they could not see without a mirror. Once the chimps had recovered from the anesthetic, a baseline for the number of times a marked area on the face was touched was obtained by observing the chimps in the absence of the mirror. After the reintroduction of the mirror the chimps touched the marked areas 25 times more often than when the mirror was absent. Given the location of the marks, the anesthesia, and the properties of the dye, the chimps could not possibly have been aware of the markings unless they saw them in the mirror and recognized the mirror image as their own.

Gallup (1977) argued that the capacity for self-recognition presupposes the existence of a self-concept. In order to correctly recognize its own reflection, an organism must already have at least a rudimentary concept of self or it would not know who it was seeing in the mirror.

Having established the existence of self-awareness and, presumably, a self-concept among the great apes, the next step for Gallup was to test the hypothesis that social interaction is necessary for the development of the self-concept. Chimpanzees reared in isolation and chimps maintained in group cages were

compared in the mirror-recognition task described above. The social isolate chimps failed to show any evidence of self-recognition (Gallup, McClure, Hill, & Bundy, 1971). However, when isolation-reared chimps were given 3 months of social experience with other chimps, they began to demonstrate the ability to self-recognize (Hill, Bundy, Gallup, & McClure, 1970). These results provide strong support for the necessity of social experience in the development of self-awareness.

Gallup (1985) also cites evidence of role-taking ability in chimpanzees which further supports the process of self-concept formation proposed by Cooley and Mead. Chimps have been observed exhibiting deception, concealment, reciprocal altruism, empathy (de Waal, 1982), and attribution of responsibility (Goodall, 1971). Such behaviors imply the ability to anticipate the actions and reactions of others. Even stronger evidence of role-taking ability in chimps can be found in an incident described by Primack and Primack (1983) in which a chimp removed a blindfold from her trainer's eyes in order to lead him to food stored in a box which only the trainer could open. When the trainer wore the blindfold around his mouth or hair, the chimp made no attempt to remove it. The chimp had had prior experience with the blindfold, but she had never seen anyone else blindfolded, suggesting that she was able to use her own experience to take the role of her trainer and anticipate his disability.

In a very similar study with human infants, Novey (cited by Kagan, 1981) allowed 18-, 27-, and 36-month-old children to play with either transparent or opaque goggles. One day later, when their mothers put on the opaque goggles, the 27- and 36-month-olds acted

as if their mothers could not see while the 18-month-olds behaved the same whether their mothers were wearing the opaque or transparent goggles. It is interesting to note that at this period of time (the end of the 2nd year) children also begin to exhibit prosocial behavior, empathy (Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1982), and other characteristics which imply some degree of role-taking ability. Research has also shown that children fail to self-recognize (in a Gallup-type mirror recognition task) until 18 to 24 months of age (see Anderson, 1984, for a review). Taken together, these findings may provide some evidence of an association between role-taking and the self-concept in humans; it seems unlikely that these abilities emerge within the same developmental time span by coincidence. Longitudinal studies of these abilities are necessary to determine which appears first and whether role-taking ever emerges without self-awareness or vice versa.

The research on the development of self-awareness in chimps and humans is consistent with the symbolic interaction perspective. Gallup (1985) has suggested that role-taking ability may have evolved due to selective pressures to anticipate and influence the behavior of others. According to the symbolic interactionists, the ability to take the role of the other allows us to become aware of ourselves and to develop a mature self-concept. Research has shown that social interaction is necessary for the development of self-awareness in chimps, and that role-taking ability and self-awareness seem to emerge at about the same time in human infants.

Effects of feedback on the self-concept. Research using human subjects has also tested various hypotheses derived from Cooley and

Mead's theories about the self. Several researchers have employed naturalistic, correlational methodologies (Felson, 1989; Manis, 1955; Miyamoto & Dornbusch, 1956) while others have relied upon experimental designs (Haas & Maehr, 1965; Hicks, 1962; Videbeck, 1960).

Correlational research has focused on the interrelationships of 1) the self-concept, 2) the actual responses of others, 3) the perceived responses of others, and 4) the generalized other. Miyamoto & Dornbusch (1956) surveyed 195 college undergraduates in 10 groups ranging from 8 to 48 persons. Subjects were asked to rate (using 5-point scales) the intelligence, self-confidence, physical attractiveness, and likableness of themselves (self-concept) and every other member of their group (actual responses of others). Using the same scales, subjects also predicted how every other member would rate them (perceived responses of others) and how most people in general would rate them (generalized other). Due to limitations in the experimental design and sampling procedure, statistical tests of significance were not employed in this study. The authors chose instead to inspect the data for consistent tendencies which supported or failed to support their hypotheses.

Miyamoto and Dornbusch's (1956) first three hypotheses concerned the relationship between the self-concept, the mean actual responses of others, and the mean perceived responses of others. As predicted, they found that subjects who actually received high ratings from others and predicted that they would receive high ratings from others tended to have high self-ratings. Further,

self-ratings tended to be closer to the mean perceived responses of others than to the mean actual responses of others.

The fact that the perceived response of others is more closely related to self-concept than the actual response of others is taken by the authors as support for both Mead and Cooley's symbolic interaction perspectives when, actually, it can be argued that this finding is much more consistent with Cooley's perspective than with Mead's. It was Cooley who emphasized the importance of the imagination or perception of another's response while Mead believed that due to the universality of symbols of communication we can objectively know what another's response would be. Thus, for Mead, another's actual response and our perception of that response should be identical. Although Mead's writings on this issue are somewhat ambiguous, the above interpretation is certainly consistent with his belief in an objectively internalized conversation of gestures and with his cognitive-behavioral point of view.

The final two hypotheses tested by Miyamoto and Dornbusch involved Mead's concept of the generalized other. They found that subjects who predicted that they would receive high ratings from others in general tended to have high self-ratings. In addition, their self-ratings tended to be closer to their perceptions of the generalized other than to their perceptions of specific others. This finding that the self-concept is more closely related to perceptions of the generalized other than to perceptions of specific others provides support for Mead's emphasis on the importance of the generalized other in the formation and modification of the self-concept.

Although this study appears to support several hypotheses derived from the works of Cooley and Mead, statements of cause and effect are not possible due to the correlational nature of the experiment. It may be that one's perception of another's response (especially the generalized other) does influence self-concept formation and change; however, it is equally likely that one's self-concept may influence one's perceptions of another's response and that this process accounts for the relationships observed by Miyamoto and Dornbusch. Both Manis (1955) and Felson (1989) have conducted longitudinal studies of the relationship between self-concept and the responses of others in attempting to establish the direction of causation.

Manis (1955) surveyed 101 male dormitory residents 5 weeks into their freshman year, and again 6 weeks later. Groups of approximately 8 men each were formed by pairing adjacent dorm rooms. Subjects were asked to rate each member of their group, themselves, and their ideal self on 24 bipolar rating scales. Manis (1955) found that the difference between subject's self-ratings and their friends' ratings of them decreased from Time1 to Time2. This increase in agreement was found to be due to changes in self-concept and not changes in others' perceptions. In other words, "the S's self-concepts were significantly influenced by their friends' opinions of them" during this 6-week period, but "the friends' perceptions of the S's were not significantly influenced by the S's self-images" (p. 369).

Felson (1989) surveyed 338 fourth- through seventh-grade students and their parents. The children were asked to rate their

intelligence, athletic ability, attractiveness, and popularity. Parents were also asked to rate their children on these characteristics and the children were asked to guess how their parents would rate them. Both the parents and the children were asked the same questions approximately 1 year later. Using lagged regression equations Felson (1989) found that children's perceptions of their parents' appraisals at Time1 affected their self-ratings at Time2 and, to a lesser extent, that parents' actual appraisals at Time1 affected their children's self-ratings at Time2. Interestingly, perceived appraisals did not mediate the relationship between actual appraisals and the self-appraisals; instead, perceived and actual appraisals had independent effects on self-appraisals. In addition, children's self-appraisals at Time1 influenced their perceptions of their parents' appraisals at Time2, but not their parents' actual appraisals at Time2. These results again support Cooley's proposition that the self-concept develops and changes largely through the influence of perceptions biased by the existing self-concept, and not, as Mead indicated, through accurate perception of actual audience feedback.

Together, these correlational studies provide strong evidence of a relationship between the self-concept, actual responses of others, perceived responses of others, and the generalized other. It appears that the existing self-concept influences one's perceptions of the responses of others and these perceptions influence the self-concept. While actual appraisals of others may also influence the self-concept, their impact appears to be much weaker and independent of one's perceptions of them. Finally, one's perceptions

of the responses of others in general is strongly associated with one's self-concept, but further investigation is necessary to clarify this relationship.

These studies may establish the existence and, to some extent, the direction of the relationships among these variables, but, due to the correlational methodology employed, they do not rule out the possibility that some variable other than those assessed may be accounting for the observed relationships. For example, both Schlenker (1980) and Felson (1989) have proposed that actual ability may affect both self-appraisals and the appraisals of others. Although Felson (1989) tested and found no support for this hypothesis with regard to intelligence, athleticism, and popularity, it is still possible that some other factor could be influencing these relationships. Numerous controlled experiments have been conducted in an attempt to eliminate extraneous variables and further clarify the effects of others' appraisals on the self-concept.

An early experiment by Videbeck (1960) typifies the experimental approach to the investigation of the relationship between others' appraisals and the self-concept. Videbeck (1960) asked 30 superior students from introductory speech classes to participate in an experiment purportedly investigating sex differences in oral communication. Each student read six poems aloud and then received evaluative feedback from a person who had been introduced as a visiting speech expert. The evaluations were actually standardized, prepared statements and half of the subjects had been randomly selected to receive positive feedback while the other half received negative feedback. Both prior to the

experimental session and after receiving the evaluations, the students were asked to rate themselves on 24 items dealing with oral communication. Some of these items assessed specific aspects of oral communication criticized by the evaluators while other items assessed characteristics which were either closely or only marginally related to those criticized.

Videbeck found that students ratings of themselves increased slightly (though not significantly) after receiving positive feedback and decreased significantly after receiving negative feedback. In addition, the effects of the feedback were confined to the aspects of oral communication specifically mentioned by the evaluators, although the closely related items did reveal slight, nonsignificant trends in the expected direction. The considerably stronger effect of the negative feedback may have been due to the biased sample of speech students used in this experiment. These superior students were probably accustomed to positive evaluations. Thus the positive evaluation of the speech expert had relatively little effect on the students' already high self-evaluations while the negative feedback was quite discrepant with their initial self-beliefs, leading to a downward revision. Subsequent research has shown that subjects are generally reluctant to accept unfavorable (Harvey & Clapp, 1965) or highly discrepant feedback unless the source of the feedback is perceived to be highly competent and knowledgeable (Binderman, Fretz, Scott, & Abrams, 1972). These findings are consistent with Videbeck's given that the source was described as a speech expert.

Hicks (1962) and Haas and Maehr (1965) have demonstrated that self-concept changes produced by evaluative feedback are

maintained for at least 6 weeks. Hicks (1962) found that positive evaluations led to initial increases in self-ratings. Repeated assessments 2 days and 8 days after the receipt of feedback revealed that the initial increases had not only persisted, but had generalized to a number of control traits about which subjects had received neutral feedback. The author suggested that while the recall of specific item ratings may have dropped over time, the general tone of the feedback was retained.

In another test of the temporal stability of experimentally induced self-concept changes, Haas and Maehr (1965, Exp. 1) asked subjects to rate their general athletic skill and then had them perform several simple physical tasks. Following the completion of the tasks, judges described as "physical development experts" (p. 102) provided the subjects with either positive or negative evaluations. Subjects' self-ratings were reassessed immediately and 1 day, 6 days, and 6 weeks after the receipt of the feedback. Self-ratings became more positive immediately following positive feedback and more negative immediately following negative feedback, and these changes were still significant (although somewhat diminished) 6 weeks later.

In a second experiment, Haas and Maehr (1965, Exp. 2) investigated the effects of repeated evaluations on the self-concept. The procedure for the second experiment was identical to the first except that subjects received a second evaluation from a different "expert" within 48 hours of the initial evaluation. Self-ratings were reassessed immediately following the first evaluation, immediately following the second evaluation, 6 days later, and 6 weeks later.

Due to ethical concerns over the long-term effects of negative feedback, only positive evaluations were given in the second experiment. Haas and Maehr (1965, Exp. 2) found that subjects' self-ratings became significantly more positive following the first evaluation and even more positive following the second evaluation. In addition, there was virtually no fading or diminishing of these changes over a 6 week period. The repeated evaluation strengthened both the immediate and long-term impact of the feedback, leading to a relatively stable, revised self-concept.

Kinch (1968) also found that repeated evaluations had a more powerful impact on the self-concept than single evaluations. Kinch asked subjects to rate their own leadership abilities and several weeks later placed them in an experimental setting where they were required to assume a position of leadership and direct the activities of others. Subjects then received positive evaluations of their leadership ability from six supposed experts in organizational dynamics. Some subjects participated in a second leadership session and received a second set of positive evaluations from the same experts. After receiving their last set of evaluations, all subjects reassessed their leadership abilities. Kinch found that positive evaluations led to increases in self-evaluations, and repeated evaluations, even when delivered by the same group of experts, led to greater increases self-evaluations than did the initial evaluations alone.

The process of self-concept formation and change proposed by Cooley and Mead is generally supported by the existing research. However, much of the correlational and virtually all of the

experimental research reviewed thus far has focused on the effects of direct feedback from other people. As Shrauger and Schoeneman (1979) have suggested, this aspect of the looking-glass-self may represent only one of the ways social interaction affects the self-concept. In fact, two studies by Blumberg (1972) suggest that the direct communication of either positive or negative evaluations may be very rare in naturalistic settings. Other aspects of Cooley and Mead's theories, such as the actor's manipulation of behavior to gain desired outcomes and imagination of the responses of specific and generalized others, must be explored to gain a more complete understanding of self-concept formation and change.

Self-Presentation

Cooley's focus on the impact of manipulated performances on the self-concept was largely neglected until Erving Goffman (1959) renewed interest in the topic with the publication of The presentation of self in everyday life. Goffman utilized a theatrical metaphor to express his belief that consciously or unconsciously, we constantly present ourselves to others and impress them in some way. Like actors in the theatre, we engage in performances, which Goffman (1959) defined as "all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way the other participants" (p. 15). The breadth of this definition illustrates Goffman's belief in the ubiquity of presentational behavior. Although he did speak of a "front region" and "backstage" in social life where presentational concerns may be more or less prevalent, he also noted that even "backstage," when one acts out of character,

"this can come to be more of a pose than the performance . . ." (p. 134). It is, perhaps, unfortunate that Goffman chose the life-as-theatre analogy to describe his position as this analogy seems to overemphasize the manipulative, conscious, and deliberate nature of presentations and fails to capture the less purposeful, unconscious, and habitual types of presentations which may account for the majority of presentational behavior.

Current self-presentational theorists are divided over what should and should not be considered presentational behavior. Some theorists believe that only intentional, manipulative, or deceptive types of behavior should be labeled self-presentational (eg. Buss & Briggs, 1984; Jones & Pittman, 1982) while others (Hogan & Sloan, 1985; Schlenker, 1980) prefer the broader definition proposed by Goffman (1959).

Jones and Pittman (1982) defined strategic self-presentation as "those features of behavior affected by power augmentation motives designed to elicit or shape others' attributions of the actor's dispositions" (p. 233). They allowed that self-presentations are not necessarily false or distorted and they claimed that behavior that is "purely expressive," habitual, task centered, or "authentic" may be largely immune to self-presentational concerns.

Buss and Briggs (1984) have adopted a similar position in attempting to specify what is self-presentational behavior and what is not. They propose that genuine expressions of emotions and personality traits, spontaneous behaviors, and habitual acts are not self-presentational and, in fact, represent the opposite pole of a continuum ranging from self-presentation to expressiveness.

Implicit in this model is the belief that self-presentations are not accurate representations of the "true" self-concept; that the actor is somehow deceiving the audience. However, as Hogan and Sloan (1985) note, there is no reason to believe that expressive people are any less deceitful than nonexpressive people. Expressive and spontaneous behaviors convey at least as much self-relevant information as any other social behavior and are just as likely to be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by impression management concerns. The only difference between expressive and nonexpressive behavior may be the image the actor seeks to create.

Schlenker (1986) has attempted to resolve this conflict by proposing a two-dimensional classification scheme based on the actor's purported motive for the activity (accuracy vs. personal advantage) and its public or private nature. Behaviors such as self-reflection and self-disclosure are considered to be attempts to accurately define the self, while self-presentation and self-deception are attempts to define the self in a personally advantageous manner. In addition, self-reflection and self-deception are considered to be private behaviors performed for the self, while self-presentation and self-disclosure are performed for a public audience.

As Schlenker (1986) points out, these dimensions are extremely useful in classifying the various approaches to the self that appear in the literature. However, to include these distinctions in the language of a self-theory may create more confusion than clarity. For example, it is misleading to label public behavior with the purported motive of conveying accurate information

"self-disclosure" when such behavior is often used to gain personal advantage. Also, in limiting self-presentation to public behavior displayed for personal advantage, we lose much of the richness and depth of the term implied by Goffman (1959) and supported by Schlenker (1980) in earlier works. These dimensions seem to reflect rather than resolve the current controversy over the definition of self-presentation.

Schlenker (1986) also suggests that these four categories can be integrated within the theory of self-identification (Schlenker, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987; Schlenker & Weigold, 1989). Self-identification is defined broadly as "the process, means, or result of showing oneself to be a particular type of person, thereby specifying one's identity" (Schlenker, 1986, p. 23). Self-presentation, self-disclosure, self-deception, and self-reflection may all be viewed as types of self-identification. Thus, the term self-identification is proposed as a less value-laden substitute for the most general definition of self-presentation. Schlenker's theory of self-identification is an extremely useful and detailed theory of self and will be outlined in later sections, but due to their similarity and in order to remain consistent with past works, the terms self-presentation and self-identification will be used interchangeably throughout this report.

Research from many areas of social psychology demonstrates that people can and do manipulate their self-presentations. Baumeister (1982) found evidence of self-presentational behavior in studies of altruism, conformity, attitude change, aggression, attribution, interpersonal attraction, and emotion. He proposed that

people vary their self-presentations either to please an immediate audience or to construct a public self-image that is congruent with their ideal self-image. Schlenker (1975) found that people enhance their self-presentations when there is no threat of public disconfirmation and present themselves accurately when disconfirmation is possible. Jones and his colleagues (Jones, 1964; Jones & Wortman, 1973; Jones & Pittman, 1982) have generated a large amount of research involving ingratiation, a specific type of self-presentational behavior "illicitly designed to influence a particular other person concerning the attractiveness of one's personal qualities" (Jones, 1964, p. 2). Given the abundance of research support, few people would question the proposition that people alter or manipulate their self-presentations. The impact that these self-presentations has on the existing self-concept is a subject of much less agreement among self-theorists.

Effect of Self-Presentation on the Self-Concept

In the past 25 years, several researchers have demonstrated that self-presentations affect the self-concept. Studies have shown that self-presentations can affect subsequent self-appraisals in terms of shifts in global self-esteem (Gergen, 1965; Jones, Gergen, & Davis, 1962; Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton, 1981; Upshaw & Yates, 1968) and more specific personality traits (Dlugolecki & Schlenker, 1987; McKillop & Schlenker, 1988; Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990; Spivak & Schlenker, 1985). Several different perspectives have been taken in the explanation of these internalization effects.

Gergen (1965) proposed a social reinforcement explanation for what he termed the "generalization of responses" from presentation to self-description. Based on a rather narrow interpretation of Cooley and Mead, Gergen asserted that a person is reinforced by others for providing certain behavior at certain times, and comes to feel that the behaviors are representative of self. He provided support for this proposition by instructing subjects to present themselves accurately or to try to create the most positive impression possible on an interviewer. The interviewer either provided the subject with "reflective reinforcement" by agreeing with positive statements about self and disagreeing with negative statements, or provided no reinforcement. Gergen expected to find positive shifts in self-ratings only when the subjects were instructed to present themselves accurately and received reflective reinforcement. However, generalization from presentation to subsequent self-ratings occurred whenever subjects received reflective reinforcement, regardless of the actor's goal in the situation (accuracy, ingratiation). He interpreted these results as strong support for the hypothesis that the self-concept is a result of social learning. Jones' (1964) interpretation of these findings was that, "persons tend to exaggerate the perceived representativeness or felt sincerity of any performance which elicits approval" (p. 67). In support of this explanation, an earlier study by Jones, Gergen and Davis (1962) found that subjects rated their prior self-presentations as more accurate when they believed they had made a favorable rather than unfavorable impression. The implication of Jones' (1964) interpretation is that

representativeness, or the degree to which a self-presentation is perceived to be an accurate portrayal of one's self-concept, is a key in determining when a presentation will be internalized.

Upshaw and Yates (1968) offer an alternative explanation for the findings of Gergen (1965). They propose a "task success" hypothesis whereby the successful completion of the task leads to the increase in self-esteem. Experimental support for this hypothesis was provided using a paradigm conceptually similar to that used by Gergen (1965). Subjects were instructed to make the best or worst possible impression when answering a personality survey and were given either favorable or unfavorable feedback (supposedly generated by a computer scoring of their survey answers). Subjects who attempted to form a favorable impression and received favorable feedback and subjects who attempted a negative presentation and received unfavorable feedback scored significantly higher on a subsequent test of self-esteem than did subjects in the other conditions. No main effects of presentation or feedback were found. The authors concluded that when feedback indicates the attempted presentation has been successful (task success), self-esteem increases. While these findings may appear to be inconsistent with those of Gergen (1965) it must be noted that the studies involved different contexts. Schlenker (1986) suggests that "self-presentations may affect both corresponding self-beliefs and feelings of self-efficacy, and different contexts may make one or both relatively salient" (p. 38). The game context of fooling a computer, used by Upshaw and Yates, may be the type of situation that would emphasize succeeding and not the relevance of

self-presentations to self-beliefs, while the task used by Gergen, creating a positive impression on an interviewer who provides personal feedback after an interaction, may focus attention on the relationship between self-presentations and self-beliefs (Schlenker, 1986).

The findings and interpretation of Upshaw and Yates (1968) are even more questionable in light of a recent study by Jones, Brenner, and Knight (1990). Jones et al. (1990) audiotaped subjects instructed to play the role of a morally reprehensible job interviewee. One week later, subjects received feedback (presumably from psychology students in a person perception seminar) that indicated they had failed or succeeded in their presentational attempt. While high self-monitors (Snyder, 1974) did exhibit higher self-esteem following success feedback than following failure feedback, low self-monitors displayed higher self-esteem following failure feedback than following success feedback.

Dissonance theory has also been employed to explain the effects of self-presentations on self-conceptions. The original version of dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) posits the existence of a drive-like motivation to maintain consistency among relevant cognitions. One prominent version of the theory (Wicklund & Brehm, 1976) states that dissonance arousal occurs only when people are personally responsible for attitude discrepant behaviors that produce negative consequences. Applied to the research on internalization of self-presentation, inconsistency between prior self-concept and self-presentation brings about a state of aversive arousal and a motivation to reduce this arousal, if one is personally

responsible for the presentation and the presentation produces negative consequences. Dissonance theory proposes that to reduce arousal, people will change the cognitive element that is least resistant to alteration (Wicklund and Brehm, 1976). Shifting one's self-concept in the direction of the self-presentation is one way of reducing dissonance, however, there are alternative modes of dissonance reduction. If the actor does not appear to be responsible for the behavior, then no change in the self-concept should occur since the actor may blame the behavior on situational demands. In addition, if the relevant aspect of the self-concept is particularly strong or stable, the actor may reduce dissonance by perceiving the presentation to be less discrepant than it actually is.

One problem with the dissonance explanation is that in order for a self-presentation to be discrepant, the aspect of the self-concept involved must be sufficiently clear and stable and not in some way implied by the presentation. Given that dissonance theory predicts that people will change the least resistant cognitive element, and a clear and stable aspect of one's self-concept would certainly be more resistant than a single self-presentation, when and how can dissonance theory adequately predict the internalization of self-presentations? Actors should be much more likely retain their initial self-beliefs and instead alter their perceptions of the discrepancy, representativeness, and situational control of their self-presentation.

Another explanation for the internalization of self-presentations can be derived from self-perception theory (Bem, 1972). Bem proposes that people may draw inferences about

characteristics of self "from observations of their own overt behavior and/or the circumstances in which this behavior occurs" (p. 2). In comparison to dissonance theory, self-perception theory places less emphasis on the structure and stability of the self-concept and, in fact, implies that the self-concept must be rather fuzzy and mutable in order for self-perception processes to take place. In addition, the self-perception explanation does not postulate an aversive motivational pressure which drives the individual to attitude change. Bem sees the actor, in many situations, as being in the same position as any other observer of his behavior; both are relying on the behavior and the conditions under which it occurred to infer the actor's attitude. This inferential process occurs only when internal cues are weak or ambiguous and external contingencies are insufficient to account for the behavior. When internal cues are strong and/or the external contingencies for the behavior obvious, self-perception will not occur and self-concept will not shift in the direction of the self-presentation.

Since Bem's (1967) proposal of self-perception as an alternative to dissonance theory, a great deal of discussion and research has been generated in the attempt to demonstrate the superiority of one or the other of the competing theories (cf. Greenwald, 1975). Despite numerous attempts at "crucial" experiments (e.g., Snyder and Ebbeson, 1972; Swann and Pittman, 1975), neither theory has been proven to be relatively superior. Several authors (Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper, 1977; Greenwald, 1975; Jones et al., 1981) have suggested that we should no longer regard the theories as competing, but as complementary.

Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper (1977) have suggested that the theories of cognitive dissonance and self-perception each apply to a different domain and, together, the two theories provide an explanation for attitude change. According to Fazio et al. (1977), attitude change following attitude-discrepant behavior is mediated by cognitive dissonance. They derive this hypothesis from research on the effect of misattribution cues on attitude change.

In one such study, Zanna and Cooper (1974) had subjects write counterattitudinal essays under conditions of high or low choice after they had been given a pill (placebo) which ostensibly produced a side effect of relaxation, tension, or no side effect. In the no side effects condition, subjects demonstrated the typical effect in which high choice subjects changed their attitudes more than low choice subjects, however, this effect failed to occur in the conditions where subjects could attribute their arousal to the pill which supposedly made them feel tense. The effect was accentuated in the relaxation conditions, presumably because the high choice subjects experienced arousal, despite believing they had taken a relaxing drug. From this study Fazio et al. (1977) infer that aversive arousal does occur when one performs a counterattitudinal behavior, a finding which directly contradicts the self-perception view that people infer their attitudes from counterattitudinal behavior without experiencing aversive motivational pressure.

Fazio et al. (1977) further suggest that attitude change following attitude congruent behavior is mediated by self-perception. They point out that dissonance theory is not applicable to situations in which proattitudinal advocacy occurs since the

theory predicts attitude change only if the behavior performed is discrepant with the attitude. Self-perception theory can explain changes following attitude congruent behavior because the theory predicts attitude change if the advocated position falls anywhere other than the person's preferred position on the attitudinal continuum.

In order to operationalize the concepts of attitude-discrepant and attitude-consistent behaviors, Fazio et al. (1977) borrowed from the work of Sherif and Hovland (1961) on latitudes of acceptance and rejection. An attitude-congruent behavior was defined as the endorsement of any position within an individual's latitude of acceptance while attitude-discrepant behavior was defined as the endorsement of any position within an individual's latitude of rejection.

To test their hypothesis concerning the differential applicability of dissonance and self-perception theories, Fazio et al. (1977) first pretested subjects to obtain their initial latitudes of acceptance and rejection and then gave them either high or low choice to endorse (by writing an essay) either the most extreme position in their latitude of acceptance, or the least extreme position in their latitude of rejection. Half the high choice subjects were told that any arousal they may experience might be due to the small booths in which they were seated (misattribution cue). As predicted, subjects who endorsed a position within their latitude of acceptance shifted their attitudes toward that endorsement when they had high choice, even when they were provided with an opportunity to misattribute arousal. Since the opportunity to

misattribute arousal did not attenuate attitude change, Fazio et al. (1977) proposed that dissonance arousal did not occur and self-perception processes were responsible for the attitude change. Subjects who freely chose to endorse a position within their latitude of rejection shifted their attitudes toward that endorsement only when they were given no misattribution cue, indicating that dissonance arousal was responsible for the shift.

Recently, Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, and Skelton (1981) conducted a set of studies designed to clarify the theoretical processes involved in the internalization of self-presentations. In the first study, subjects were shown videotaped portions of three previous interviews in which subjects had been either self-enhancing or self-deprecating. Half of the subjects viewed the tapes before they participated in an interview, while the other half viewed the tapes afterwards. When the tapes were viewed after the interview, they had (of course) no effect on interview behavior and no pre-post interview change in self-esteem ratings was observed. Subjects who viewed self-enhancing or self-deprecating models before their interview imitated this behavior during their interview session. Also, subsequent ratings of self-esteem indicated a significant carry-over effect, with subjects shifting their self-esteem in the direction of their self-presentation. A second study replicated these findings in a role playing context designed to reduce the need for the radical deceptions which were used in the first study.

A third study extended the argument of Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper (1977) to attitudes toward the self, specifically

self-esteem. Jones et al. propose that, since people generally regard themselves positively, a self-deprecating presentation should fall in an individual's latitude of rejection and self-esteem changes should be mediated by dissonance arousal, while self-enhancing presentations should fall into an individual's latitude of acceptance and invoke a biased-scanning variant of the self-perception process. This biased-scanning approach views the self-concept as "a complex set of alternative conceptions with continuously shifting salience" (Jones et al., 1981, p. 408). Self-presentation has the effect of making one of these alternative views of the self salient, and this view will remain salient unless something intervenes to redefine the self. This approach differs from the self-perception assumption that the actor's prior self-conception is essentially overwhelmed by the more salient self-presentational behavior. Jones et al. propose that the biased-scanning variant differs operationally from dissonance theory in that "the crucial ingredient in biased scanning theory is not whether an individual has or has not the freedom to engage in the suggested behavior at all, but whether the behavior is seen as owned by the actor and reflective of his or her phenomenal self" (Jones et al., 1981, p. 419).

Jones et al. (1981, Exp. 3) provided support for the biased-scanning hypothesis and the differential application of self-perception and dissonance theories. In this study, subjects were asked to act in a self-enhancing or self-deprecating manner in a simulated job interview and were either given or not given a choice to perform the task. Further, subjects were either allowed to

generate their own self-presentation within the bounds of the instructions (self-referencing), or were asked to follow a script based on the responses of a matched subject in the self-generated presentation condition (yoked). Jones et al. found that subjects in the self-enhancing condition raised their subsequent self-esteem ratings when the presentation was self-referencing, but not when it was yoked. The choice variable had no effect in the self-enhancing condition, as the biased-scanning hypothesis would predict. In the self-deprecating condition, only the choice variable had an effect. Subjects given a choice whether or not to perform a self-deprecating presentation later exhibited decreased self-esteem, while those in the no-choice condition exhibited no change. The self-referencing variable had no effect in the self-deprecating condition.

The assertion by Jones et al. that choice and personal responsibility can be used to distinguish self-concept change due to dissonance from self-concept change due to self-perception has been sharply criticized by Schlenker (1986). Schlenker provides an alternative explanation of the findings based on the perceived self-representativeness of the behavior. A presentation is perceived to be representative of the self to the extent that it seems to be descriptive of enduring personal characteristics and this perception may be influenced by many factors, including the choice and self-referencing manipulations used by Jones et al. (1981). Schlenker suggests that "subjects in the Jones et al. study may simply have shifted their self-feelings in the direction of their behavior whenever the behavior seemed to be representative of the self"

(Schlenker, 1986, p. 39). Self-deprecation is such an uncommon and socially unexpected behavior that people may consider it self-representative only when they have freely chosen to perform the role. On the other hand, since self-enhancement is a far more common and expected behavior, virtually everyone would agree to perform a self-enhancing behavior. In this case choice may be less relevant to attributions of self-representativeness while the freedom to select the details of the performance (self-referencing) may increase perceived representativeness.

The Jones et al. (1981) study has been conceptually replicated by Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir (1986). The replication incorporated the latitude of acceptance, latitudes of rejection methodology of Fazio et al. (1977) by crossing level of depression (depressed vs nondepressed) with valence of presentation. Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir (1986) proposed that self-enhancing presentations by nondepressed subjects and self-deprecating presentations by depressed subjects would fall into the latitude of acceptance and self-esteem change would be mediated by self-perception. Self-enhancing presentations by depressed subjects and self-deprecating presentations by nondepressed subjects were expected to fall in the latitudes of rejection and cognitive dissonance would account for shifts in self-esteem following the self-presentations. Self-referencing and choice variables were manipulated as in the Jones et al. (1981) study with the expectation that self-perception processes would be affected by the self-referencing manipulation while cognitive dissonance processes would be sensitive to the manipulation of choice.

The findings for the nondepressed subjects replicated the Jones et al. (1981) results. Self-enhancing interview behavior influenced subsequent ratings of self-esteem only when the behavior was self-referencing; the choice variable had no effect. Self-deprecating behavior was internalized only under conditions suggesting high choice; the self-referencing variable had no effect here. The pattern of results for the depressed subjects was the converse of those for the nondepressed. For the depressed subjects, the self-enhancing behavior influenced self-esteem only under high choice conditions, suggesting the operation of dissonance processes. Self-deprecating behavior influenced self-esteem only when the behavior was self-referencing, implicating self-perception processes.

Although Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir's (1986) use of depressed vs. nondepressed subjects is a clever attempt to incorporate the latitudes of acceptance and rejection concepts, manipulation checks reported in a footnote suggest that the attempt was not entirely successful. Depressed subjects, for whom a self-enhancing presentation was expected to fall in the latitude of rejection, actually rated self-enhancing behavior as a truer reflection of themselves than self-deprecating behavior. The authors attempt to explain this contradiction by suggesting that, since subjects responded to the manipulation check before the post-interview self-esteem measure, they may have been reducing dissonance by claiming that their interview behavior was consistent with their true selves. If subjects reduced their dissonance in this way, what produced their shift in self-ratings? Also, if depressed,

self-enhancing subjects reduced their dissonance in this manner, why didn't nondepressed, self-deprecating subjects display the same pattern on this manipulation check? The authors failed to address these issues and instead continued to interpret their findings as if their manipulations had been successful.

Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir (1986) did mention that the ambiguity surrounding their attempt to indirectly incorporate the latitudes of rejection and acceptance "highlights the need for subsequent research to include independent assessments of latitudes of the self" (p. 52). Such assessments were employed by Schlenker and Trudeau (1990) in a study which conceptually replicated Fazio et al. (1977) and extended their findings to the domain of self-presentationally induced self-concept change.

Schlenker and Trudeau (1990) pretested subjects to determine their self-ratings on the trait "independence", their behavioral consistency on the trait, and their latitudes of acceptance and rejection. One week later, subjects participated in the experimental session. In the first part of the session, subjects were told that the study was an investigation of the effects of a harmless drug on mental efficiency. They were given the drug (actually a placebo) and half the subjects were told that it may make them feel somewhat tense while the other half were told that they would experience no side effects. While they were waiting for the pill to take effect, subjects were asked to participate in a brief, presumably unrelated project in another lab. The "other project" involved presenting themselves in a simulated job interview patterned after Jones et al. (1981). Subjects were randomly assigned to present themselves as

either relatively independent or dependent within either their latitudes of acceptance or rejection.

Schlenker and Trudeau (1990) found that subjects with strong prior self-beliefs (as indicated by their ratings of high consistency) shifted their self-ratings in the direction of their self-presentation only when the presentation was in their latitude of acceptance. Presentations in the latitudes of rejection had no impact on self-ratings. The authors suggested that these subjects used their strong beliefs as "anchors to evaluate the self-diagnostics of behavior" (p. 29). Behavior that was slightly incongruent with prior beliefs led to shifts in self-ratings while extremely incongruent behavior was dismissed. For subjects with weak prior self-beliefs (as indicated by ratings of low consistency), self-ratings shifted in the direction of self-presentations in either the latitude of acceptance or the latitudes of rejection. These subjects inferred their self-beliefs directly from their presentational behavior, becoming more extreme in their ratings following more extreme behavior.

In addition to the findings regarding the strength of prior self-beliefs, Schlenker and Trudeau also found that the misattribution manipulation affected the rationalizations subjects employed. Subjects who presented themselves in their latitudes of rejection claimed less personal responsibility for their behavior when they were told that the pill would have no side effects than when they were told that the pill would have tension-producing side effects. Extreme presentations, which should produce aversive arousal (Fazio et al., 1977), are rationalized by claiming less personal responsibility, except when the arousal could be misattributed to

the side effects of the pill. When subjects' presentations fell within their latitude of acceptance, no aversive arousal should be generated and self-ratings of personal responsibility were not influenced by the misattribution cue.

Schlenker and Trudeau present these findings as support for the two-process model proposed by Fazio et al. (1977) even though they found a misattribution effect only on measures of personal responsibility and not on self-ratings of independence. The authors suggest that the aversive arousal resulting from the extreme presentations can be reduced by either shifting self-beliefs or denying responsibility for the behavior. Specific self-beliefs concerning one's independence may be more resistant to change than the more general, less self-related attitudes investigated by Fazio et al. Therefore, while subjects in the Fazio et al. study reduced the arousal by shifting their attitudes in the direction of their presentation, subjects in the Schlenker and Trudeau study reduced the arousal by denying responsibility for their behavior.

Schlenker's view of the two-process approach differs somewhat from that of Fazio et al. (1977) and Jones et al. (1981). Rather than employing both dissonance theory and self-perception theory to account for the obtained findings, Schlenker incorporates both explanations within his theory of self-identification.

Self-identification involves an attempt by the individual to construct and express desirable identity images (Schlenker, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1987). These images reflect what people believe they could and should be, and are influenced by characteristics of the individual, the situation, and the audience (Schlenker, 1980,

1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987). Desirable identity images must meet situationally defined criteria of believability and beneficiality. An image must be believable in the sense that it is consistent with available evidence, and beneficial in that the image helps satisfy the actor's goals.

Schlenker (1986) incorporates the two-process approach by suggesting that self-identifications may be processed in a relatively active or passive manner. In most everyday situations, self-identifications occur without extensive prior thought and planning. They are based on scripts which have been used successfully in the past, and do not represent a clear break from the current self-concept. Schlenker (1986) suggests that if such self-identifications influence the self-concept at all, they are likely to do so through passive processes, such as self-perception (Bem, 1972) or the biased-scanning variant (Jones et al., 1981) and people will rely on situational cues to determine whether the behavior is representative of self. If these cues (eg. choice, consistency) indicate that the behavior is representative and prior self-beliefs are weak or not salient, then self-beliefs will shift in the direction of the self-presentation. If the situational cues indicate that the behavior is not representative of self or prior self-beliefs are strong or salient, then the self-presentation will have no effect on self-beliefs. Passive processing seems to occur in situations where the relevant identity-images are less important and there are few impediments to the construction of desired identities (McKillop & Schlenker, 1988; Schlenker, 1986).

There are occasions, however, where a great deal of thought and planning precede a self-identification. When a presentation involves important desired identity images, or impediments to the creation of a desired identity image are encountered, a more active assessment process will be generated (Schlenker, 1986, 1987). According to Schlenker (1986), "active assessment produces more intensified processing of information pertinent to the problem, including information about one's identity. Further, it produces attempts to reconcile this information with one's desired identity images as best as possible" (p. 41). These attempts at reconciliation may take the form of either shifts in self-beliefs, attempts to rationalize the behavior, or both.

When prior self-beliefs are weak or uncertain and the behavior appears to be representative of self, self-beliefs may shift in the direction of the presentation. However, when prior self-beliefs are strong and well defined, active processing makes salient a wealth of information with which to counterargue the implications of the presentation. Counterarguing may involve the use of accounts to minimize the actor's responsibility for the presentation (excuses), or downplay the negative implications of the presentation (justifications) (Schlenker, 1986). If these accounts successfully eliminate the threat to the desired identity images, then self-beliefs will not change. If the accounts do not completely eliminate the threat, further counterarguing cause self-beliefs to shift in the direction opposite the self-presentation. Both Spivak and Schlenker (1985) and McKillop and Schlenker (1987) have found evidence of these boomerang effects following negative presentations.

Spivak and Schlenker (1985) asked subjects to present a negative image of their social sensitivity--an ambiguous trait descriptor which most individuals believe is important. For half of the subjects the instructions stressed that while playing their assigned role they should be relatively truthful (representative). The other half of the subjects were told that they could lie if necessary to create the assigned role (unrepresentative). When subjects gave a negative presentation following instructions suggesting the role was unrepresentative of self, they did not change their self-beliefs. However, when instructions suggesting the role was representative of self preceded a negative self-presentation, subjects increased their ratings of social sensitivity.

Spivak and Schlenker (1985) also found evidence of active counterarguing when instructions suggested that a positive presentation was unrepresentative of self. These subjects' important, desired image concerning social sensitivity was threatened by the unrepresentative nature of the presentation, so they compensated by increasing their private self-ratings on the trait. When the instructions suggested that a positive presentation was representative of self, no threat was aroused and subjects' ratings of social sensitivity did not shift.

In a more direct test of Schlenker's (1986) predictions regarding levels of processing, McKillop and Schlenker (1987) generated active or passive processing by manipulating subjects' perceptions of the importance of the trait practicality after subjects had performed a negative presentation on this trait. When subjects believed that practicality was a relatively unimportant

trait, their self-ratings of practicality decreased following their negative presentation. This finding supports Schlenker's (1986) prediction that self-presentations involving unimportant identity images will be passively processed leading to shifts in the direction of the presentation. When subjects believed that practicality was a relatively important trait, their self-ratings of practicality increased following their negative presentation, again providing evidence of active counterarguing leading to a reaffirmation of a desired identity image. Further evidence of active counterarguing was revealed by subjects use of accounts to deny the representativeness of the negative presentation when they believed practicality was an important trait.

Although there is no direct evidence of a boomerang effect following positive presentations, Schlenker (1986) suggests that there are occasions when positive presentations may threaten desired identity images and stimulate active counterarguing. "To the extent that excessively positive self-presentations commit actors to standards that they doubt they will be able to maintain, they pose a threat and arouse anxiety" (p. 52). According to Schlenker, such presentations are accounted for by rejecting their representativeness. While Schlenker does not mention the possibility that downward shifts in self-beliefs may also be employed to counterargue the identity-threatening future expectations generated by an excessively positive self-presentation, it is certainly consistent with his theory.

As this review demonstrates, there is currently a wealth of data indicating that self-presentations influence both specific and

global aspects of the self-concept. In addition, it is important to note that in most of these studies, self-concept changes take place in the absence of any direct audience feedback. These results, along with the findings of Myamoto and Dornbusch (1956) and Felson (1989), support Cooley's contention that it is the imagination of other's reactions to our appearance that is critical in self-concept formation and change. Clearly, direct feedback from others is not necessary to motivate self-concept change.

Despite the strength of these findings, the self-presentational research program can be criticized as lacking external validity. While care is taken to maintain experimental realism in most of these studies, one critical aspect of the process of self-concept change has been neglected. All of the research on self-presentationally induced self-concept change has involved a single presentation followed by an immediate assessment of the actor's self-beliefs. However, in the "real world" people are constantly presenting themselves to others and reevaluating their own self-beliefs. The interaction and combination of these multiple self-presentations may affect self-beliefs in a manner that is completely different from that of a single self-presentation.

Although no previous research has examined the effects of multiple presentations, several self-theorists have questioned the stability and longevity of self-concept changes based on a single self-presentation.

Although the subjects in this experiment were not necessarily affected in any profound way, the importance of the above findings would not seem to rest on the

longevity of the produced effects. Given that the principle is valid, it would follow that with more intense learning experiences more deep-seated effects could be produced. (Gergen, 1965, p. 422).

Neither of these effects is expected to be permanent, of course, but the results do have suggestive implications for the resultant self-esteem of those who frequently engage in either self-enhancing or self-deprecating social maneuvers. . . . it is possible to imagine fortuitously initiated self-concept changes leading to confirmatory actions that cement those changes. (Jones et al., 1981, p. 421).

How long will the type of modification in self-concept illustrated by the present experiment be maintained? . . . We can only suggest, as do Jones et al. (1981), that the change in self-concept is maintained until some subsequent event or behavior implicates other dispositions as being self-descriptive. (Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981, p. 241).

Fazio, Effrein, and Falender (1981) have suggested that while a single presentation may produce only temporary shifts in the self-concept, these temporary shifts affect subsequent behavior which, in turn, may strengthen or exaggerate the initial self-concept change. In support of this possibility, studies by Fazio et al. (1981) and Dlugolecki, Doherty, and Schlenker (1990) demonstrated that self-presentations influence not only self-ratings, but subsequent behavior as well.

Fazio et al. (1981) induced subjects to present themselves in an introverted or extraverted manner by asking them a series of leading questions. Following the presentation, each subject was led to another room and asked to wait for a few minutes. Behavioral

measures of extraversion were obtained by a blind, female confederate already seated in the room who recorded how close the subject sat to her, whether or not the subject initiated conversation, and the amount of time the subject spent talking. The confederate and two blind, independent judges also evaluated subjects' extraversion based on their behavior in the waiting room. Finally, subjects' self-reported extraversion was measured either before or after the behavioral measures were obtained.

Subjects who engaged in extraverted self-presentations later rated themselves as more extraverted than subjects who had engaged in an introverted self-presentation. In addition, the differential presentations affected subjects' later behavior in the waiting room situation which was separated from the experiment. Compared to subjects who had completed an introverted presentation, subjects who had completed an extroverted presentation sat closer to the confederate, were more likely to initiate conversation, spent more time talking, and were considered to be more extraverted by both the confederate and the independent judges.

Dlugolecki, Doherty, and Schlenker (1990), have recently conceptually replicated Fazio et al. (1981) with regard to sociable self-presentations. Subjects who presented themselves sociably in a simulated job interview later rated themselves as being more sociable, generated more examples of past sociable behavior, and behaved more sociably in an unrelated waiting room situation similar to that used by Fazio et al. (1981).

The results of these studies provide further support for the cyclic process of self-concept change explicitly or implicitly described by every self-theorist mentioned in this paper. When in social interaction, people present images of themselves to real or imagined audiences and receive real or imagined feedback from these audiences. This feedback affects the actor's existing self-concept which influences future behavior (including self-presentations) in the same or unrelated situations. These subsequent self-presentations again elicit real or imagined feedback and the cycle of self-concept formation and change continues. Each component of the cycle has been investigated in isolation, and Fazio et al. (1981) and Dlugolecki, Doherty, and Schlenker (1990) have explored the interaction of two of the components, but no one has studied the process as a whole. Thus, the primary purpose of this study is to more accurately represent the process of self-concept change by exploring the impact of multiple presentations.

Overview and Hypotheses

Overview

This study examined the effects of initial presentational role on subsequent self-presentations and the combined impact of initial and subsequent self-presentations on self-ratings of sociability.

All subjects were pretested in an unrelated context to determine self-ratings of sociability and self-esteem. In the experimental session, subjects were asked to create a positive, negative, or accurate impression of their sociability in a videotaped,

simulated interview session. After the taping of the first session, three-fourths of the subjects were asked to give a second positive, negative, or accurate presentation while the remaining one-fourth were not asked to perform a second presentation. Finally, all subjects completed a questionnaire packet containing the main dependent measures and manipulation checks. The design of this study is thus a 3 X 4 factorial with first presentational role (sociable, unsociable, accurate) and second presentational role (sociable, unsociable, accurate, no presentation) as between subjects factors.

Hypotheses

Effects of single self-presentation on self-rated sociability.

The first set of hypotheses concerned the effects of the single sociable, unsociable, or accurate self-presentation on subsequent self-ratings of sociability. Previous studies have examined this issue and have yielded inconsistent results.

Both Dlugolecki and Schlenker (1987) and McKillop, Berzonski, and Schlenker (1990) have found that subjects' self-beliefs shift in the direction of their presentation following a face-to-face, sociable self-presentation in a simulated job interview setting. However, following an unsociable self-presentation McKillop et al. (1990) found lowered self-ratings of sociability while Dlugolecki and Schlenker observed a boomerang effect with subjects raising their self-ratings of sociability. Slight differences in the methodologies employed by these researchers may account for these contradictory findings. Dlugolecki and Schlenker introduced a

cognitive activity manipulation immediately after the presentation and before the the completion of the dependent measures. This manipulation successfully induced subjects to recall specific behavioral examples of their sociability. Although the manipulation had no direct effect on subjects' self-ratings, it may have stimulated active processing and counterarguing of the unsociable self-presentation, thus leading to the boomerang effect. Subjects in the study by McKillop et al. completed the dependent measures immediately after their self-presentations, passively processed the self-relevant information, and shifted their self-beliefs in the direction of their self-presentations.

No previous research has investigated the impact of a single, accurate presentation of sociability on subsequent self-beliefs, but Gergen (1965) did find that an accurate presentation involving general self-esteem had the same impact on self-beliefs as a positive presentation when both were followed by reflective reinforcement (see pp. 30-31 for complete description of study and findings). In contrast, when an accurate self-presentation was not followed by reflective reinforcement, no changes in self-beliefs were observed.

Based on prior research, it was predicted that a single, sociable presentation would lead to increases in self-rated sociability. The predictions concerning self-rating shifts following a single, unsociable presentation were not as clear. If the self-presentations were actively processed, counterarguing should lead to a boomerang effect with increases in self-rated sociability; if the self-presentations were passively processed, they should be

internalized and self-rated sociability should decrease (Schlenker, 1986). Given that the methodology used in this study was virtually identical to that used in the face-to-face presentation conditions of the McKillop et al. study and did not include the cognitive activity manipulation employed by Dlugolecki and Schlenker (1987), it was predicted that a single, unsociable presentation would lead to decreases in self-rated sociability. Finally, since this study did not involve the delivery of reflective reinforcement, it was predicted that a single, accurate presentation of sociability would produce no shifts in self-rated sociability.

Effects of multiple self-presentations on self-rated sociability. The second set of hypotheses concerned the combined impact of two self-presentations on subsequent self-ratings of sociability. As noted above, no previous research has directly examined this issue, and the few theoretical statements mentioning multiple presentations (Fazio et al., 1981; Gergen, 1965; Jones et al., 1981) are rather vague and contain few specific predictions. As evidenced by the quotes cited above (pp. 50-51), these authors do seem to agree that repeated self-presentations create similar, though perhaps more powerful, shifts in the self-concept as single presentations. This prediction received some indirect support from two studies (Haas & Maehr, 1965, Exp. 2; Kinch, 1968) that showed that repeated, positive feedback led to greater increases in self-evaluations than a single, positive evaluation.

Based on this theoretical and empirical evidence, it was predicted that following repeated presentations (e.g., sociable-sociable, unsociable-unsociable, accurate-accurate) subjects would

shift their self-ratings in the direction of their self-presentation. Further, these shifts should be equal to, or greater than, the self-rating shifts following single self-presentations.

The remainder of the multiple presentation predictions involve situations in which the subjects were asked to present two, different self-images (e.g., sociable-unsociable, accurate-sociable). Although no existing theoretical position even mentions the effects of multiple, different self-presentations, it is possible to logically derive several hypotheses by combining Schlenker's predictions concerning active versus passive processing with the empirically-based single self-presentation predictions.

When the initial self-presentation was accurate, it was predicted that subsequent self-ratings and presentational behavior would remain unchanged. Thus, the effects of a second, sociable or unsociable presentation on self-ratings were predicted to be identical to the effects of a single sociable or unsociable presentation.

When the initial self-presentation was sociable, it was predicted that subsequent self-ratings and presentational behavior would become more sociable. In this situation a second, accurate presentation would be perceived as somewhat self-derogatory, yet within the latitude of acceptance, and sociability self-ratings would be lower than those of subjects who performed a single, sociable presentation. In contrast, a second, unsociable presentation would be perceived as extremely self-derogatory and within the latitude of rejection. This unsociable presentation would stimulate active counterarguing and a boomerang effect with these subjects rating

themselves as more sociable than subjects who performed a single, sociable presentation.

Finally, when the initial self-presentation was unsociable, it was predicted that subsequent self-ratings and presentational behavior would become less sociable. In this situation a second, accurate presentation would be perceived as somewhat self-enhancing, yet within the latitude of acceptance, and sociability self-ratings would be higher than those of subjects who performed a single, unsociable presentation. A second, sociable presentation would be perceived as extremely self-enhancing and within the latitude of rejection. This sociable presentation would stimulate active processing but because there was no threat of future disconfirmation, subjects would not counterargue the implications of the presentation and sociability self-ratings would again be higher than those of subjects who performed a single, unsociable presentation.

Effects of initial self-presentation on subsequent self-presentations. The final set of hypotheses involved the effects of the first presentational role on the performance of the second presentation. Although no previous research has directly addressed this issue, the studies of Fazio et al. (1981) and Dlugolecki and Schlenker (1987) would appear to be relevant. These researchers found that following a self-presentation, both self-beliefs and social behavior shifted in the direction of the presentation. The social behavior observed in these two studies involved a waiting-room interaction which could clearly be considered a form of self-presentation. Thus, it was predicted that subjects in this study

would present themselves more sociably following an initial, sociable presentation than following an initial, unsociable presentation with subjects who performed an initial, accurate presentation falling intermediate. In addition, since the sociable and unsociable role-playing instructions might have constrained subjects' second presentations, it was predicted that these effects would be most pronounced when subjects were asked to give an accurate second presentation.

CHAPTER 2 METHOD

Pretest

During their normal class meetings, approximately 400 introductory psychology students completed a series of questionnaires including an extended version of the Cheek and Buss Shyness and Sociability scale (1981), and the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem scale. From this subject pool, 144 subjects were randomly selected, contacted via telephone, and asked to participate in a study entitled "Simulated Job Interviews" in partial fulfillment of their course requirement. At this point subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 12 possible experimental conditions.

Experimental Session and Cover Story

Upon arrival at the experimental session, subjects were greeted by the experimenter and asked to read and sign a consent form which explained that the study concerned simulated interviews, and that their task would be to act as a stimulus person in an interview session. The consent form also stated that the subject was free to discontinue participation at any time and still receive experimental credit. After collecting the consent forms, the experimenter explained the purpose of the interview, gave the subjects instructions on the role they were to enact and the tactics they could use to create the desired impression (see Appendix A).

Subjects were asked to play the role of a student applying for a research assistant's position during a simulated job interview session. They were told that the session would be videotaped and that these tapes would be shown to graduate students who were studying personality-based job interview techniques. In order to make the situation more realistic and involving, subjects were told that the students who would be viewing their videotape would believe that they were an actual candidate for a research assistant's position and would be required to make a judgement about the subject's adequacy for the position. The experimenter explained that the interview would contain a few general questions, but that the main focus of the interview would be on sociability, a trait being studied by the graduate class. Subjects were told that the graduate students would believe that they were observing an actual interview, and would not be told of this deception until two weeks later when their interview techniques were assessed in class. This cover story is similar to one used by Jones et al. (1981, Exp. 3), and is designed to justify the necessity of the interview, mask the actual purpose of the experiment, and maximize the importance of the interview situation for the subject. The purpose of announcing the delay in debriefing the graduate students was to insure that the subject's behavior could not be "taken back," thus diluting the impact of the interview (Davis and Jones, 1960).

Independent Variables

First Presentational Role and Choice Manipulations

Next, the experimenter explained that in order to provide the graduate student trainees with a wide range of interview behaviors, subjects would be asked to adopt different goals and strategies when answering the interview questions. Subjects in the positive presentation condition were asked to present themselves in the "best possible light" and to try to get the interviewer to form a good impression of their sociability. If assigned to the negative presentation condition, subjects were asked to present themselves in a "negative light" and to try to get the interviewer to form a poor impression of their sociability. Finally, subjects in the accurate presentation condition were asked to present themselves honestly and accurately and to try to get the interviewer to form an accurate impression of their sociability.

After the experimenter finished reading the instructions, he or she added: "We realize that some people might object to responding in a way other than they really feel. You don't mind helping us out, do you?" This statement and the choice manipulation contained in the consent form were designed to emphasize that the subjects had free choice about whether or not to participate in any portion of this study. High choice has been shown to maximize internalization effects in previous studies (Fazio et al., 1977; Jones et al., 1981).

Next, the experimenter reminded the subjects that they must continue to play their assigned role as long as the videotape was running, turned on the camera, and began the interview session.

Second Presentational Role Manipulation

Following the first interview session, some subjects were asked to repeat their initial presentation. They were told that since the graduate class was rather large, and we wanted to be sure that each student had an opportunity to see their interview, we would like to have at least two copies of their videotape. They were asked if they would mind going through the interview one more time and were reminded of their initial role instructions.

Subjects in conditions requiring them to present themselves differently in the second presentation were told that in order to expose the graduate students to a full range of interview behaviors, we would like them to go through the interview one more time and play a different role. They were given the new role instructions and asked if they would mind going through the interview one more time.

In all conditions involving a second presentation, subjects were told not to worry about remembering how they answered the questions in the first interview since each student in the class would view only one of their tapes and any inconsistencies between their two interviews would not be noticed.

Some subjects were not asked to give a second presentation. These subjects completed the dependent measures packet immediately after the first interview. No mention of a second presentation was made and there was no time delay. These first presentation only conditions served as baselines for comparisons of the effects of single versus multiple presentations.

Interview Session

In order to insure that each subject received the same treatment in the interview situation and to minimize the potential effects of each experimenter's personality, the experimenters were instructed and carefully trained to maintain a neutral demeanor, neither approving nor disapproving of the subject's presentation, and the interview was based on a script (see Appendix B) which was identical for each subject. The interview began with a greeting and exchange of first names. This was followed by a series of hypothetical situations, adjective descriptors, and self-ratings, ostensibly designed to assess sociability. The experimenter recorded the subject's responses to each item on an answer sheet and, when the interview was completed, turned off the video recorder and led the subject to a different location in the room.

Dependent Measures and Manipulation Checks

Finally, the subjects were given a packet of questionnaires containing the dependent measures and manipulation checks (see Appendix C) with instructions to disregard the role they were asked to play in the interview and answer the questions honestly. To convince subjects of the anonymity of their responses to this questionnaire and reduce the likelihood that their responses represented an attempt to please the experimenter, they were told not to sign their name or place any identifying marks on the questionnaire. Subjects were also be told that their data would only be seen by an experimental assistant who would code it anonymously

and that the experimenter would receive feedback in the form of group data only, and would not know how each individual responded.

The questionnaire began with three questions asking the subject to rate, on 7-point scales, how enjoyable, interesting, and worthwhile the simulated interview project was. On the next page was the posttest extended version of the Shyness and Sociability scale (Cheek & Buss, 1981).

The Shyness and Sociability scale developed by Cheek and Buss (1981) contains only five items assessing sociability and nine assessing shyness (the main focus of the authors' work). Because scales consisting of so few items often have poor internal reliability (Nunnally, 1978), seven additional items were added to the original scale. Analyzing the pretest data for the 144 subjects who participated in this experiment, it was found that each of the new items was significantly ($p < .0001$) correlated with the original sociability scale (r 's = .38 - .68). Factor analysis of the revised scale revealed one factor accounting for 44% of the variance with each item loading substantially (.49 - .83) on this factor. In addition, Cronbach's Alpha for the revised scale = .88 as compared to Alpha = .70 for the original scale (Cheek & Buss, 1981). Given the improvement in internal reliability and the fact that previous research (McKillop, Berzonski, & Schlenker, 1990) has yielded virtually identical patterns of results using the revised and original scales, this study utilized the revised scale as the primary measure of sociability.

The next page of the questionnaire contained five, 15-point scales assessing the subject's current mood (e.g., tense--relaxed,

sad--happy), and the 10 item Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale. The following section consisted of nine 15-point scales dealing with the subject's behavior and feelings during the interviews. On these items and the remaining manipulation checks subjects were asked to respond first concerning their first interview, and then concerning their second interview. The next two pages of the questionnaire contained checks of the manipulations of choice and role, as well as items designed to assess subjects' perceived responsibility for their behavior during the interviews and the representativeness of their interview behavior.

Prior research suggests that one way for subjects to reduce the arousal produced by a negative presentation is to attack the audience for the presentation (Jones, Gergen, & Davis, 1962; McKillop & Schlenker, 1988). To examine this effect, several items assessing subjects' perceptions of the graduate students who would be viewing their videotapes were included on the last few pages of the questionnaire.

The final page of the questionnaire contained a behavioral recall task. Subjects were asked to think of some incidents that they felt were relevant to their sociability; these could be occasions where they felt their sociability had been especially good, average, or poor. Next, they were asked to briefly describe five such incidents and rate each incident on a 7-point scale ranging from extremely sociable (1), to extremely unsociable (7).

After collecting the questionnaire packet, the experimenter carefully questioned each subject for suspicion regarding the true nature of the study and debriefed them by following a standardized

debriefing script (see Appendix D). Subjects were asked to keep the actual purpose of the study a secret until the end of the semester due to the deception necessary, given their experimental credit, and thanked for participating.

CHAPTER 3 RESULTS

Design

Unless otherwise stated, all major analyses were conducted via two-way analyses of variance with first presentational role (sociable, unsociable, accurate) and second presentational role (sociable, unsociable, accurate, no presentation) as between subject factors. Given that this study contained a detailed set of specific hypotheses and the omnibus F -test is more appropriate in the absence of specific hypotheses (Keppel, 1982), planned comparisons were conducted without regard for the significance or nonsignificance of the omnibus F -test.

Manipulation Checks

This study required that we manipulate subject's self-presentations in the first and second interview as well as their perceptions of choice to perform these behaviors. The following analyses were conducted to ascertain the effectiveness of these manipulations.

Self-Presentations

The effectiveness of the presentational role manipulations was assessed through analysis of subjects' responses to the three key sections of the interviews. Subjects' responses to the bipolar

adjective ratings, self-ratings, and percentile ranking were converted to z -scores and averaged to provide an index of self-presentational behavior.

First presentational role. Analysis of subjects' behavior in the first interview revealed a main effect of first presentational role, $F(2,131)=143.58$, $p<.0001$. Subjects instructed to present themselves unsociably gave less sociable responses in the interview session than subjects instructed to present themselves accurately, $F(1,131)=128.72$, $p<.0001$, who, in turn, responded less sociably than subjects instructed to present themselves sociably, $F(1,131)=27.96$, $p<.0001$ ($M_s=-1.039$, $.205$, and $.774$, respectively).

Second presentational role. The second presentational role instructions produced the same pattern of behavior in the second interview. The main effect of second presentational role, $F(2,97)=252.69$, $p<.0001$, was again clarified by planned comparisons indicating that subjects instructed to present themselves unsociably gave less sociable responses in the interview session than subjects instructed to present themselves accurately, $F(1,97)=225.96$, $p<.0001$, who, in turn, responded less sociably than subjects instructed to present themselves sociably, $F(1,97)=51.04$, $p<.0001$ ($M_s=-1.149$, $.240$, and $.902$, respectively).

Choice

The choice manipulation was designed to ensure that all subjects perceived a high degree of choice concerning whether or not to participate in the interview sessions. The efficacy of this manipulation was supported by subjects' responses to a question

asking them to rate the degree of choice they felt they had in whether or not to participate. On 9-point scales with 1 labeled "no choice at all" and 9 labeled "totally free choice", the mean ratings were 7.64 for the first interview and 7.73 for the second interview.

Dependent Measures

Shifts in Sociability

Analysis of pretest sociability self-ratings revealed no significant main effects or interactions. Shifts in self-rated sociability were measured by subtracting pretest sociability scores ($M=46.76$, $SD=8.81$) from posttest sociability scores ($M=48.86$, $SD=7.59$). Thus, a positive change score indicates an increase in sociability following the self-presentations while a negative score represents a decrease in sociability. The overall mean change score was 2.10 with a standard deviation of 6.53.

Effects of single self-presentations on self-rated sociability.

The effects of a single self-presentation on changes in sociability were examined via planned comparisons of change scores in the conditions requiring no second presentations. A simple main effect of first presentational role when no second presentation was given, $F(2,131)=3.56$, $p<.05$, was clarified by pairwise comparisons which indicated that subjects who presented themselves unsociably showed a significantly greater increase in sociability than subjects who presented themselves accurately, $F(1,131)=5.98$, $p<.05$, or sociably, $F(1,131)=4.70$, $p<.05$ (see Table 1 for means). The change

scores in the accurate, no second presentation and positive, no second presentation conditions did not differ significantly.

TABLE 1
Sociability Change Scores

Second Presentation	First Presentation		
	Negative	Positive	Accurate
Negative	2.27	3.75	3.92
Positive	0.27a	1.42	0.25
Accurate	1.08b	-0.25	2.75
No Presentation	5.92abcd	0.85c	0.08d

Note. Positive sociability change scores indicate an increase in sociability from pretest to posttest. Means with a common single-letter subscript differ by at least $p < .05$.

This boomerang effect following a single, negative presentation replicates the findings of Dlugolecki and Schlenker (1987) and seems to contradict the findings of McKillop, Berzonski, and Schlenker (1990). Possible interpretations of these unexpected results will be explored in the discussion section.

Effects of multiple self-presentations on self-rated sociability. The hypotheses concerning multiple self-presentations were tested by planned comparisons of change scores in each of the

multiple presentation conditions with scores in the appropriate single presentation condition. This strategy resulted in the following 9 single-df comparisons: accurate, accurate vs. accurate, no presentation; accurate, negative vs. accurate, no presentation; accurate, positive vs. accurate, no presentation; negative, accurate vs. negative, no presentation; negative, negative vs. negative, no presentation; negative, positive vs. negative, no presentation; positive, accurate vs. positive, no presentation; positive, negative vs. positive, no presentation; positive, positive vs. positive, no presentation.

Significant differences were found only for the negative, accurate vs. negative, no presentation, $E(1,131)=4.11$, $p<.05$, and the negative, positive vs. negative, no presentation, $E(1,131)=5.36$, $p<.05$, comparisons (see Table 1 for means). These results indicate that the increase in sociability following a single, negative presentation was eliminated when subjects performed a second presentation that was either accurate or positive.

Self-Presentations

The hypotheses concerning the effects of initial self-presentations on subsequent self-presentations were tested by assessing the simple main effect of first presentational role on subjects' behavior in the second interview (as measured by the z -score index described above). The simple main effect of first presentational role was significant only when subjects were instructed to give an accurate second presentation, $E(2,97)=3.59$, $p<.05$. Further, planned comparisons revealed that subjects

instructed to give an accurate second presentation behaved more sociably following an initial, unsociable, $E(1,97)=5.92$, $p<.05$, or accurate, $E(1,97)=4.81$, $p<.05$, presentation than following an initial positive presentation (see Table 2 for means). Additional planned comparisons indicated that this effect occurred only when subjects were instructed to give an accurate second presentation.

TABLE 2
Behavior in the Second Interview

Second Presentation	First Presentation		
	Negative	Positive	Accurate
Negative	-1.05	-1.18	-1.20
Positive	.79	.90	1.00
Accurate	.38a	.00ab	.34b

Note. Scores represent the average z -score for subjects' responses to the three portions of the interview. All pairwise comparisons for the simple main effect of the second presentation are significant (p 's<.05). In all other cases, means with a common single-letter subscript differ by at least $p<.05$.

Representativeness

Although no specific predictions were made regarding subjects' perceptions of the representativeness of their interview behavior, analysis of these perceptions was undertaken due to their important mediational role in prior research (McKillop & Schlenker,

1987; Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990). In this study, the degree to which a presentation was perceived to be representative of self was assessed by three, bipolar scales asking subjects to rate how deceptive vs. truthful, fake vs. genuine, and unrepresentative vs. representative they had felt during each of their interviews. These three measures were highly correlated ($r_s > .92$) and yielded identical patterns, so they were averaged to simplify discussion of the results.

A significant main effect of second presentational role on subjects' perceptions of the representativeness of their behavior in the second interview, $E(2,97)=120.23$, $p < .0001$, was further elucidated by simple effects tests which showed that subjects who performed a negative second presentation perceived their behavior to be less representative than subjects who performed positive, $E(1,97)=90.81$, $p < .0001$, or accurate, $E(1,97)=236.16$, $p < .0001$, second presentations ($M_s=3.43$, 9.52 , and 13.30 , respectively). An accurate second presentation was also perceived to be more representative than a positive presentation, $E(1,97)=33.26$, $p < .0001$.

The first presentational role also had an effect on subjects' perceptions of their behavior in the second interview, $E(2,97)=7.46$, $p < .001$; an effect that is best understood in the context of a significant first x second presentational role interaction, $E(4,97)=3.64$, $p < .01$ (see Table 3 for means). Simple effects tests showed that subjects who performed a negative first presentation perceived a positive second presentation to be more representative than subjects who performed a positive, $E(1,97)=4.50$, $p < .05$, or accurate, $E(1,97)=26.59$, $p < .0001$, first presentation. The positive

second presentation was also perceived to be less representative following an initial, accurate presentation than following an initial, positive presentation, $E(1,97)=9.63$, $p<.005$.

TABLE 3

Perceptions of the Representativeness of the Second Self-Presentation

Second Presentation	First Presentation		
	Negative	Positive	Accurate
Negative	4.27	2.97	3.11
Positive	*12.33a	9.94a	6.53a
Accurate	*13.72	12.92	13.25

Note. Higher numbers indicate greater ratings of representativeness on a 15-point scale. All pairwise comparisons for the simple main effect of the second presentation are significant (p 's<.05), except as noted by asterisks. In all other cases, means with a common single-letter subscript differ by at least $p<.05$.

Logically, the nature of the first presentational role should not have any bearing on the representativeness of the second presentation. These findings suggest a perceptual or memory bias allowing subjects to reduce the threat of an initial, negative presentation by exaggerating the representativeness of the positive presentation that followed.

Perceptions of the Audience

The threatening nature of the unsociable presentation was further supported by analyses of subjects' perceptions of how much the graduate students (who would be viewing their videotapes) would like them if they had an opportunity to interact at a later date. A significant main effect of first presentational role, $E(2,131)=7.81$, $p<.001$, was qualified by a marginally significant first x second presentational role interaction, $E(6,131)=2.11$, $p=.057$ (see Table 4).

TABLE 4
Subjects' Perceptions of How Much the Graduate Students Would Like Them

Second Presentation	First Presentation		
	Negative	Positive	Accurate
Negative	4.00	4.08de	3.33
Positive	3.91	2.58e	3.25
Accurate	3.58c	3.33	2.67
No Presentation	5.00abc	2.61ad	2.17b
OVERALL MEAN	4.13fg	3.14f	2.85g

Note. Lower numbers indicate greater perceived liking. Means with a common single-letter subscript differ by at least $p<.05$.

Simple effects tests revealed a simple main effect of first presentational role only when no second presentation was performed, $E(2,131)=10.66$, $p<.0001$. Subjects believed the graduate students would like them less following a single unsociable presentation than following a single accurate, $E(1,131)=18.31$, $p<.0001$, or sociable, $E(1,131)=13.49$, $p<.001$, presentation.

Self-Esteem

Changes in self-esteem were examined to determine whether the observed changes in sociability self-ratings could have been caused by shifts in global self-evaluations.

Shifts in self-esteem were measured by subtracting pretest self-esteem scores ($M=42.47$, $SD=7.81$) from posttest self-esteem scores ($M=43.49$, $SD=5.33$). Thus, a positive change score indicates an increase in self-esteem following the self-presentations while a negative score represents a decrease in self-esteem. The overall mean change score was 1.16 with a standard deviation of 6.26.

Analysis of pretest self-esteem scores revealed only a marginally significant main effect of second presentational role, $E(3,127)=2.46$, $p<.07$. Although none of the pairwise comparisons reached significance, inspection of the means indicated that subjects in the accurate and negative second self-presentation conditions had lower self-esteem scores than subjects in the no second presentation and positive second presentation conditions ($M_s=41.09$, 40.71 , 44.31 , and 44.44 , respectively). This finding may invalidate or at least cast suspicion upon any significant changes in self-esteem as a function of second presentational role.

Analysis of self-esteem change scores yielded only a significant main effect of second self-presentational role, $E(3,126)=3.00$, $p<.05$, with subjects who gave an accurate second presentation showing a greater increase in self-esteem than subjects who gave a positive, $E(1,126)=7.09$, $p<.01$, or no second presentation, $E(1,126)=5.53$, $p<.05$ (see Table 5 for means).

TABLE 5
Self-Esteem Change Scores

Second Presentation	First Presentation			OVERALL MEAN
	Negative	Positive	Accurate	
Negative	.91	4.18	-.08	1.62
Positive	-2.00	.25	-.18	-.62b
Accurate	1.90	2.67	4.42a	3.06bc
No Presentation	-.33	.08	-.33a	-.19c

Note. Positive self-esteem change scores indicate an increase in self-esteem from pretest to posttest. Means with a common single-letter subscript differ by at least $p<.05$.

The series of contrasts planned to test the hypotheses concerning sociability shifts were also applied to the self-esteem change scores resulting in only one significant difference. Subjects who gave accurate first and second presentations showed greater increases in self-esteem than subjects who gave an accurate first

presentation and no second presentation, $E(1,126)=4.17$, $p<.05$ (see Table 5 for means).

It is possible that the opportunity to present themselves accurately and consistently caused subjects to feel good about themselves in general, however, as mentioned above, very little confidence can be placed in any interpretation of these findings due to the observed pattern of pretest self-esteem differences. In any case, the pattern of self-esteem changes does not resemble the observed changes in sociability indicating that the sociability shifts were not caused by changes in global self-evaluations.

Mood

Further evidence that the shifts in sociability were not the result of global affective shifts was found in subjects' responses to five items assessing their postpresentational mood. Analyses of these five items yielded no significant main effects or interactions ($ps>.10$). In addition, the series of contrasts used to test the hypotheses concerning sociability shifts were also applied to these items resulting in no significant differences ($ps>.05$).

Behavioral Recall Task

Finally, analyses of the behavioral recall measure yielded no significant main effects or interactions ($ps>.70$). It was expected that subjects' behavioral recall would display the same pattern as their shifts in sociability; however, the planned comparisons revealed no significant differences ($ps>.10$).

CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of initial self-presentations on subsequent self-presentations and the combined impact of multiple self-presentations on self-beliefs. In the absence of any theoretical statements or empirical evidence bearing directly on this issue, hypotheses were logically derived from several related lines of research. The results generally failed to support these hypotheses.

Effects of Single Self-Presentations on Self-Rated Sociability

It was predicted that a single, sociable self-presentation would lead to increases in self-rated sociability; a single, unsociable self-presentation would lead to decreases in self-rated sociability; and a single, accurate self-presentation would produce no change in self-rated sociability. As expected, subjects who presented themselves accurately exhibited no change in sociability. However, the results in the sociable and unsociable presentation conditions did not support the predictions. Subjects who presented themselves sociably reported no change in sociability while subjects who presented themselves unsociably increased their self-rated sociability. This boomerang effect following a negative self-presentation is certainly not unprecedented (McKillop & Schlenker,

1987; Dlugolecki & Schlenker, 1987), but had not been predicted in the current study due to the findings of McKillop et al. (1990) who reported presentationally consistent shifts in sociability following a face-to-face job interview simulation.

Why did McKillop et al. find a decrease in sociability following an unsociable presentation while this study found an increase? The most reasonable explanation involves the major difference in the methodologies of the two studies. The simulated job interviews in the McKillop et al. study were conducted by a single interviewer in a face-to-face interaction with the subject. In this study, the interviews were conducted by the experimenter and videotaped for later evaluation by an entire class of interviewer trainees. At least two aspects of this methodological difference may be responsible for the discrepant findings. First, subjects in the present study were told that their videotapes would be seen by a number of students in the interviewing class while subjects in the McKillop et al. study confronted only one graduate student interviewer. This difference in the size of the audience may have made subjects feel more evaluation conscious and threatened by the implications of a negative presentation. This threat may also have been enhanced by the relative permanence of the videotaped presentation. By intensifying the threat to a desired identity image, the larger audience may have stimulated active counterarguing (Schlenker, 1986, 1987) resulting in the observed boomerang effect.

In addition to the enlarged audience for the self-presentation, the second important aspect of the videotape methodology which may account for the discrepant results is the use of the video

camera. Several authors have suggested that video cameras may be used to manipulate self-focused attention (Davis & Brock, 1975; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Geller & Shaver, 1976). More recently, Carver & Scheier (1981) have claimed that cameras actually manipulate public self-awareness and have generated some empirical support for this claim (Scheier & Carver, 1980). Individuals who are made publicly self-aware tend to be acutely conscious of the aspects of themselves they are displaying to others and of the impressions they are making on others. Fenigstein (1979) found that persons high in public self-consciousness (the dispositional equivalent of the state of public self-awareness) are more sensitive to interpersonal rejection than those low in public self-consciousness. The exposure of subjects to the video camera in this experiment may have induced public self-awareness and an increased concern with the creation of desired identity images. The self-aware state may have magnified the threat of the unsociable presentation leading subjects to counterargue and subsequently increase their ratings of sociability.

Given that previous research has used face-to-face presentations (e.g., Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990), videotaped presentations (e.g., Kelly, McKillop, & Neimeyer, in press) and a combination of the two (Jones et al., 1981; Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986), these speculations concerning possible differences between the two methodologies need to be explored in future research.

Effects of Multiple Self-Presentations on Self-Rated Sociability

It is difficult to assess the degree to which the hypotheses concerning the effects of multiple presentations were supported by the data due to the unexpected results of the single self-presentation manipulations.

It was predicted that repeated presentations (sociable-sociable, unsociable-unsociable, accurate-accurate) would lead to sociability shifts in the same direction as single presentations. Although the single presentation shifts were not in the expected direction, the shifts following repeated presentations did track the single presentation results and none of the planned comparisons differed significantly. None of the predictions involving comparisons between multiple and single self-presentations were confirmed, but this may have been largely due to the single self-presentation results.

The boomerang effect resulting in substantial increases in sociability following a single, negative self-presentation was eliminated when subjects performed a second presentation that was either positive or accurate. The opportunity to reaffirm desired identity images by portraying oneself more positively in a second presentation may have reduced subjects' need to counterargue the implications of the initial, negative self-presentation. Having repaired the threatened image through the second presentation, there was no longer any need to bolster self-ratings of sociability.

The Role of Self-Esteem

Upshaw and Yates (1968) have proposed that the successful completion of a task can lead to increased self-esteem even if the task is to present oneself negatively. If this is true, then the boomerang effect in the present study may simply reflect an overall rise in self-esteem following the successful completion of an unsociable presentation. For this reason it is important to note that the pattern of changes in self-esteem was not similar to the pattern of sociability changes and could not be responsible for the observed boomerang effect.

Effects of Initial Self-Presentations on Subsequent Self-Presentations

The results concerning the effects of initial self-presentations on subsequent self-presentations also failed to confirm the hypotheses. Based on the studies of Fazio et al. (1981) and Dlugolecki and Schlenker (1987), it was predicted that subjects in this study would present themselves more sociably following an initial, sociable presentation than following an initial, unsociable presentation with subjects who performed an initial, accurate presentation falling intermediate.

Initial presentational role did influence the performance of the second presentation, but only in the accurate second presentation conditions. This finding was not surprising in that it was anticipated that the sociable and unsociable role-playing instructions might overwhelm any effect of the initial presentation. However, the pattern of the observed results was surprising as

subjects instructed to give an accurate second presentation behaved more sociably following initial accurate or unsociable presentations than following an initial, sociable presentation.

These findings may reflect an attempt by subjects who had presented themselves unsociably in the initial interview to reaffirm a desired identity image by presenting themselves sociably when given the opportunity to do so later. In contrast, subjects who had initially presented themselves sociably may have felt no need to exaggerate their sociability in the second interview, or may have even downplayed their sociability to avoid committing themselves to an overly positive self-image which would have been difficult to maintain in future interactions.

The inconsistencies between these findings and those of Fazio et al. (1981) and Dlugolecki and Schlenker (1987) may be due to methodological differences between these studies.

First, the behavior of subjects in the present study following an initial, negative presentation was the opposite of the behavior of the subjects in the Fazio et al. research. This may be due to the subtle manipulation of self-presentational behavior employed by Fazio et al. In asking leading questions to induce introverted or extroverted presentations, it is likely that Fazio et al. were able to manipulate subjects' behavior without making subjects aware that their presentations were incongruent with their initial self-beliefs. In this situation, self-beliefs shifted via a relatively passive, self-perception process and these shifts were reflected in the subsequent waiting room behavior. Since subjects were not aware of any threat to a desired identity image and made no attempt to

counterargue the implications of their presentations, there was no need to reaffirm their self-beliefs. In this study, self-presentations were manipulated in a very direct manner which forced subjects to become aware of the incongruency between their presentations and their initial self-beliefs. The awareness of this incongruency was strongest following unsociable presentations, which subjects reported to be extremely unrepresentative of their true selves. In this situation, the threat to a desired identity image was obvious and subjects actively counterargued the implications of their unsociable presentations. This counterarguing carried over to their second presentation as they attempted to reaffirm the threatened images.

The behavior of subjects in this study following an initial, positive presentation was inconsistent with the findings of Fazio et al. (1981) and Dlugolecki and Schlenker (1987). The reason for this discrepancy is not as clear but may be related to differences between the studies with regard to the audience for the second presentations. Both Fazio et al. and Dlugolecki and Schlenker assessed subsequent behavior by observing subjects' interactions with a confederate in a waiting room situation. The confederate, who comprised the audience for the subjects' second presentations, clearly had no knowledge of subjects' initial presentation. In the present experiment, although subjects' were told that each taped presentation would be shown to different members of the interviewing class, the experimenter was present during both interviews. It is possible that subjects in this study were concerned with publicly committing themselves to an overly

positive self-image in front of the experimenter, a person with whom they expected to interact after the interview sessions. This may account for the less sociable second presentation observed in the present study while subjects in the two studies employing clearly independent audiences felt free to aggrandize their self-images in both presentational contexts.

The Resiliency of the Self

Taken together, the results of this study suggest a self-corrective tendency which may render the self-concept more resistant to change than has been previously suggested. Several converging pieces of evidence indicate that when confronted with an identity-threatening, unsociable self-presentation, subjects will use any means available to counterargue the implications of this presentation.

First, when subjects were asked to perform a single, unsociable self-presentation, they later inflated their private self-ratings of sociability. Greenberg and Pyszczynski (1985) observed a similar effect following public, failure feedback and labeled it "compensatory self-inflation." The present study extends their findings by demonstrating that direct, audience feedback is not necessary to stimulate compensatory behavior. As Cooley (1902) suggested, even in the absence of an observable response, we imagine the judgement of the other. In addition, it should be noted that the compensatory behavior was not directed toward the external audience since self-ratings of sociability were obtained under completely anonymous conditions; the inflated self-ratings

seem to have been intended to appease some private, internal audience.

Second, when subjects were given the opportunity to present themselves accurately following the threatening, unsociable self-presentation, they bolstered their self-image by presenting themselves more sociably than they had following an initial, sociable presentation. Further evidence of reaffirmation can be seen as subjects who presented themselves sociably following an initial, unsociable self-presentation exaggerated the representativeness of their sociable presentations. Both of these tactics appear to have been successful in reducing the threat of the initial, unsociable self-presentation as subjects who performed a second, accurate or sociable presentation did not display the boomerang effect found after a single, unsociable self-presentation. Steele and Liu (1983) reported a similar finding following a standard forced-compliance procedure. Subjects given the opportunity to affirm an important, self-relevant value after writing a counterattitudinal essay exhibited no attitude change while those who affirmed a value not relevant to their self-concepts did show dissonance-reducing attitude change. In the present study, subjects were able to affirm their sociability by performing sociable second presentations and perceiving these presentations to be extremely representative-of-self. Having affirmed the self and removed the threat, subjects were no longer motivated to counterargue and displayed no shifts in self-beliefs.

Implications

Methodological

The present study may demonstrate the sensitivity of presentational research to minute variations in experimental procedures. In future research exploring self-presentationally induced self-concept change, the various methodologies described in this paper (e.g., live audience vs. video, multiple audiences vs. single, subtle vs. overt presentational induction) must be compared to determine their unique impact on shifts in self-beliefs. Until this information is available, any attempt to compare or generalize from the findings of the methodologically diverse studies in this area will be extremely difficult.

Theoretical

The importance of the well-documented shifts in self-beliefs following single self-presentations seems to rest on the assumption that these shifts will influence future self-beliefs. Gergen (1965), Jones et al. (1981), and Fazio et al. (1981) have all proposed that self-concept shifts resulting from single self-presentations are likely to be maintained or even enhanced as a result of subsequent self-presentations; but none of these theorists has made any attempt to test these assumptions. The results of the present study indicate that simplistic and global theoretical statements concerning the impact of multiple self-presentations may be inaccurate and misleading. While it is possible that some shifts may be maintained or enhanced following subsequent presentations,

it is equally possible that initial shifts may be eliminated and self-beliefs may return to their initial level. The conditions under which each of these outcomes may obtain should be specified in future theoretical statements.

APPENDIX A EXPERIMENTAL SCRIPT

Hello. Before we begin I would like you to read the informed consent form I've given you and if you have no questions, sign it and we'll get started. (Give subject 2 copies of informed consent)

Cover Story

The project in which you will be participating involves simulated interview situations. One purpose of the project is to provide practical experience for graduate students who are enrolled in a class on Personality Assessment Techniques. As part of their training in personality assessment, these graduate students must have experience in different types of interview situations. At this point in their training the students are learning personality-based job interview techniques. What we would like you to do is play the role of a student applying for an Undergraduate Research Assistant's position.

Interviewers are often asked to determine whether or not an applicant for a position has the type of personality best suited for the particular job. If employees with a certain trait are desired, the interview may focus on that specific trait. The interview we will be conducting today will focus on the trait "sociability," which is one of the traits being studied by the graduate class. In the

interview, you will be asked a number of personality-type questions regarding how sociable you are. The interviewer will begin by asking a few general questions about yourself such as your hobbies, favorite books, and intended major. However, the main focus of the interview will be on your sociability. The object of the interview is not to assess job-related skills, but personal characteristics.

To provide a uniform experience for the students in the class, we will make a videotape of your interview. I will ask the questions and your responses will be taped and later shown to the graduate students for analysis and discussion. The students will watch the tapes individually and form independent opinions. Later, their evaluations will be discussed in the class. All of the questions used in the interview were developed by the students themselves as part of the training exercise. To make the situation more realistic and involving for the students in the class, they will be told that you are an actual candidate for a research assistant's position, and will be asked to make a judgement about your adequacy for the position. That is, the students who watch the videotape will believe that you are actually applying for a job as an Undergraduate Research Assistant, and that their evaluations will influence whether or not you get the job. They will not be told of this deception until after their evaluations have been reviewed and graded in class. Thus, we must ask you to be careful, while we are taping the interview, not to reveal in any way that this briefing has occurred. Do you think you can help us out?

In everyday interactions, of course, people sometimes describe themselves totally accurately, while other times they may slightly

or significantly misrepresent information about their attitudes, preferences, skills and experiences. This range is particularly noticeable during job interviews. In order to capture the wide range of ways in which people describe themselves we are asking different subjects in this experiment to adopt different goals and strategies for responding during the interview. By including this range, we can better assess the ways interviewers use information when forming impressions about the people they interview.

First Presentational Role Manipulations

Sociable and Unsociable

In your case, we would like you to present yourself in the **"worst/best possible light"** and try to get the interviewer to form a **bad/good** impression about your sociability. Feel free to exaggerate your weaknesses/strengths and underplay your strengths/weaknesses, tailoring what you say to make a **bad/good** impression. Your goal should be to make as **negative/positive** an impression of your sociability as possible while still seeming credible and sincere.

We have found that the best way to present yourself in the "worst/best possible light" is to really get yourself mentally into the role. Think of occasions when you really felt extremely unsociable/sociable. Now, thinking of yourself in this way, simply answer the questions so that your feelings are conveyed in both the mood and content of your answers. We realize that some people might object to responding in a way other than they really feel. Do you mind helping us out?

Accurate

In your case, we would like you to behave naturally and try to get the interviewer to form an **accurate** impression about your sociability. Simply answer the interview questions **honestly** and present yourself **as you really are**. Your goal should be to make as **accurate** an impression of your sociability as possible.

For all subjects, the script continued as follows:

Okay. I realize I've just given you an awful lot of information. Do you understand what we're asking you to do and the role we've asked you to play? Please remember that once I begin the video recorder you must continue to play your assigned role until the taping session is over. (turn on camera, aim, focus, take your seat and begin reading from the interview sheet).

Subjects in the single presentation conditions were given the dependent measures packet immediately after completing their presentation. For subjects in the multiple presentation conditions, the script continued as follows:

Second Presentational Role Manipulations

(After finishing the interview, turn off the camera and read the instructions and explanation of the second presentation)

Repeated

As I explained earlier, the main purpose of this project is to create videotapes which will be shown to graduate students who are studying job interview techniques. Since this class is rather large,

and we want to be sure that each student has an opportunity to see your interview, we would like to have at least two copies of your videotape. Would you mind going through the job interview and allowing us to tape you one more time?

Sociable and unsociable. Remember, your role was to present yourself in the "**worst/best possible light**" and try to get the interviewer to form a **bad/good** impression about your sociability. Don't worry about remembering how you answered the questions in the first interview, just get yourself mentally into the role and answer the questions so that you seem as **unsociable/sociable** as possible while still seeming credible and sincere. Each student in the class will view only one of your tapes, so slight inconsistencies between your first interview and this one will not be noticed.

Accurate. Remember, your role was to present yourself **as you really are** and answer the interview questions **honestly**. Don't worry about remembering how you answered the questions in the first interview, just behave naturally and try to get the interviewer to form an **accurate** impression about your sociability. Each student in the class will view only one of your tapes, so slight inconsistencies between your first interview and this one will not be noticed.

Different

As I explained earlier, the main purpose of this project is to create videotapes which will be shown to graduate students who are studying job interview techniques. In order to expose these students

to a full range of interview behaviors, we would like you to go through the interview procedure one more time.

Sociable and unsociable. In this second interview, we would like you to present yourself in the "**best/ worst** possible light" and try to get the interviewer to form a **good/bad** impression about your sociability. Would you mind going through the job interview and allowing us to tape you one more time?

Don't worry about remembering how you answered the questions in the first interview, just get yourself mentally into the role and answer the questions so that you seem as **sociable/ unsociable** as possible while still seeming credible and sincere. Each student in the class will view only one of your tapes, so the inconsistencies between your first interview and this one will not be noticed.

Accurate. In this second interview, we would like you to present yourself **as you really are**. Simply disregard the role we asked you to play earlier and answer the interview questions **honestly**. Would you mind going through the job interview and allowing us to tape you one more time?

Don't worry about remembering how you answered the questions in the first interview, just behave naturally and try to get the interviewer to form an **accurate** impression about your sociability. Each student in the class will view only one of your tapes, so the inconsistencies between your first interview and this one will not be noticed.

For all subjects, the script continued as follows:

Once again, please remember that once I begin the video recorder you must continue to play your assigned role until the taping session is over. (turn on the camera, aim, focus, take your seat and begin reading from the interview sheet. When the subjects has finished the interview, turn off the camera, bring them to the other chair, give them the dependent measures packet and say:)

The last thing we would like you to do is to complete these questionnaires. Just read the instructions, disregard the role we asked you to play earlier, and answer honestly.

(When the subject completes the packet, collect it, and begin to probe for suspicion. Once you have completed this, read the subject the debriefing, make sure the subject understands the debriefing, thank her for participating, and have her sign the credit assignment sheet).

(Once the subject has gone, write their subject number, condition, and sex on the upper right hand corner of the dependent measures packet, staple it to the interview response sheet, and place it in the file cabinet).

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

I. HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS

Hi, I'm _____. And your first name is? So I can get to know you a little bit, I'd like you to answer a few questions for me:

1. If you had a bad day, are you more likely to do something alone, like exercise, read a book or watch T.V., or do something in a group, such as talk to friends or go out with a bunch of friends?
 - a. Alone (Ask: "Such as what? Give me one example.")
 - b. Group (Ask: "Such as what? Give me one example.")
2. When you enter a room full of strangers, do you feel:
 - a. Uncomfortable
 - b. Comfortable
 - c. Or, does how you feel depend on the situation.
3. How difficult is it for you to make new friends?
 - a. Difficult
 - b. Not difficult
 - c. Or very easy

4. What is your reaction to people with unusual haircuts or clothing? Do you tend to:
 - a. Stay away from them
 - b. Tolerate them
 - c. Or, appreciate such individual differences

5. If you were discussing a movie with friends and they all liked it but you thought it was terrible, would you be most likely to:
 - a. Be quiet
 - b. Start an argument
 - c. State your opinion tactfully
 - d. Go along with the group

6. When you have a problem, do you prefer to:
 - a. Work it out alone
 - b. Have someone else solve it for you
 - c. Seek advice from someone you respect

II. ADJECTIVE PAIRS

Okay, that's good. Next I'm going to read you 10 pairs of adjectives. You are going to assign a total of 100 points to each pair, based on how accurately each member of the pair describes you. For instance, if each were equally descriptive, you would assign 50 points to each word. If one is very descriptive and the other not very descriptive, you might assign 90 points to the very descriptive one and only 10 points to

the other. Any combination of numbers that totals 100 points may be used: for example, 75 and 25, 20 and 80, or 5 and 95. Do you understand what you are to do? Okay let's begin.

1. Independent	Companionable **
2. Friendly **	Persistent
3. Progressive **	Good-tempered
4. Amusing **	Creative
5. Self-sufficient	Social **
6. Cooperative **	Individualistic
7. Introspective	Sociable **
8. Out-going **	Reserved
9. Strong-minded	Agreeable **
10. Quiet	Outspoken **

III SELF-RATINGS

Okay. This next part is fairly simple. I'm going to read you ten statements, one at a time, and all you have to do is tell me how much you agree that the statement describes you, on a five-point scale.

1 = strong disagreement, 2 = slight disagreement, 3 = neither agreement or disagreement, 4 = slight agreement, 5 = strong agreement. Remember, the higher the number you use, the more you are agreeing the statement describes you. Any questions? Okay, let's begin.

1. Tries to be a good listener
2. Able to keep disagreements from becoming arguments
3. Reacts negatively to constructive criticism
4. Likes to spend quiet time alone
5. Prefers to be with people
6. Enjoys parties
7. Able to work effectively with others
8. Tends to stand out in a group
9. Able to maintain cordial relations with someone you don't like
10. Makes others feel at ease

IV. Good, we're almost finished. The last thing I want you to do is to give me a percentile ranking for how sociable you are, relative to the University of Florida student body. Where do you think you rank, from 1 to 99? If you think you are the least sociable, your percentile would be 1; if you are exactly average, your percentile would be 50; and if you are the most sociable your percentile would be 99. Where do you think you rank on sociability?

Okay, that's all the questions I have for you. It's been nice talking with you.

APPENDIX C

DEPENDENT MEASURES

The psychology department is interested in obtaining the reactions of students who participate in the various projects conducted as instructional aids. Therefore, we would like you to complete the questionnaires contained in this packet. Some of the questions asked will be fairly general, and will be asked of participants in all the projects. Other questions will be tailored to reflect the specific content of the project at hand. All of your responses are strictly for the use of the department. The experimenters involved will not have access to the questionnaires; they will receive feedback only in the form of group data, and will not know how each individual responded. Please answer honestly, so that we may better assess the merits of each particular project and also of this type of endeavor in general. Thank you!

(General Questions)

1. How enjoyable did you find participating in the project to be?
Extremely unenjoyable 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 Extremely enjoyable
2. How interesting was the project?
Extremely uninteresting 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 Extremely interesting

3. How worthwhile do you feel your participation will be for the students in the interview class?

Extremely 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 Extremely
unworthwhile worthwhile

(Extended Shyness and Sociability Scale)

For each of the following statements, indicate how characteristic or uncharacteristic each item is of you, using the scale below. Please do not skip any items.

- 1 = extremely uncharacteristic
- 2 = slightly uncharacteristic
- 3 = neither characteristic nor uncharacteristic
- 4 = slightly characteristic
- 5 = extremely characteristic

- _____1. I am socially somewhat awkward.
- _____2. I don't find it hard to talk to strangers.
- _____3. I feel tense when I am with people I don't know well.
- _____4. When conversing I worry about saying something dumb.
- _____5. I feel nervous when speaking to someone in authority.
- _____6. I am uncomfortable at parties and other social functions.
- _____7. I feel inhibited in social situations.
- _____8. I have trouble looking someone right in the eye.
- _____9. I am more shy with members of the opposite sex.
- _____10. I like to be with people.
- _____11. I welcome the opportunity to mix socially with people.
- _____12. I prefer working with others rather than alone.
- _____13. I find people more stimulating than anything else.

- ____14. I'd be unhappy if I were prevented from making many social contacts.
- ____15. I find it easy to talk to strangers.
- ____16. I like meeting people.
- ____17. I enjoy being alone rather than with other people.
- ____18. I am sociable.
- ____19. I do not enjoy meeting people.
- ____20. I like to talk with people.
- ____21. I do not enjoy just being with others.

(Ratings of Mood)

Please rate how you feel right now, by circling the appropriate number on each of the following scales.

tense	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	relaxed
depressed	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	cheerful
at ease	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	worried
dissatisfied	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	satisfied
happy	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	sad

(Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale)

Please answer each of the following questions by circling the appropriate number on the scale that follows (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree).

1. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.
strongly disagree 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 strongly agree
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
strongly disagree 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 strongly agree
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
strongly disagree 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 strongly agree
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
strongly disagree 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 strongly agree
5. I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.
strongly disagree 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 strongly agree
6. I take a positive attitude toward people.
strongly disagree 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 strongly agree
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
strongly disagree 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 strongly agree
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
strongly disagree 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 strongly agree
9. I certainly feel useless at times.
strongly disagree 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 strongly agree
10. At times I think I am no good at all.
strongly disagree 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 strongly agree

(Self-Ratings of Sociability)

Circle the number on the scale which describes your position.

How good or bad is it to be sociable?

Good 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 Bad

deceptive	(1st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	truthful
	(2nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	
genuine	(1st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	fake
	(2nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	
unrepresentative of me	(1st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	representative of me
	(2nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	
important	(1st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	unimportant
	(2nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	
self-derogatory	(1st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	self-enhancing
	(2nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	
required	(1st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	voluntary
	(2nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	
tense	(1st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	relaxed
	(2nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	
calm	(1st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	nervous
	(2nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	
public	(1st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	private
	(2nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15	

Please answer the following questions. Again, if you did not participate in a second interview, please leave those scales blank.

1. How responsible do you personally feel for the way you presented yourself during the interviews?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
totally responsible			not at all responsible
	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	

2. How much choice did you feel you had in whether or not to participate?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
no choice at all			totally free choice
	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	

3. During the interviews, did your descriptions of how sociable you are reflect more what the experimenter told you to do, or how sociable you believe you really are?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
experimenter's instructions			own belief
	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	

4. During the interviews, to what extent did you exaggerate your answers to the questions concerning how sociable you are, giving answers that overestimated or underestimated how you really feel about yourself?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
extremely			not at all
	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	

5. How anonymous did you feel during the interview situations?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
extremely			not at all
	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	

6. When describing yourself in the interviews, how sociable were you attempting to be?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
extremely unsociable			extremely sociable
	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	

7. How sociable do you think you will appear to the graduate students who will watch your videotapes?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
extremely unsociable			extremely sociable
	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	

8. How positive or negative an impression do you think the graduate students will form of you overall?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
extremely negative			extremely positive
	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	

9. How much did you misrepresent yourself in the interview situations?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
not at all			extremely
	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	

10. How motivated were you to create the impression you were trying to make in the interview situations?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
not at all			extremely
	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	

11. How much thought did you invest in creating the intended impression in the interviews?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
very little			a great deal
	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	

12. How personally committed did you feel to your responses during the interviews?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
little commitment			highly committed
	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	

13. How much effort (mental and physical) did you invest in your responses during the interview?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
little effort			great effort
	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	

(Perceptions of the Audience)

We would like to get some information concerning your perceptions of the graduate students who will be viewing your videotaped sessions. These next few questions and scales refer to these individuals. We realize that you have never met these students but

we would like you to try to imagine what they would be like and answer the questions accordingly.

1. How would you rate these individuals' ability to discriminate between sociable and unsociable people?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
very good	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	very bad

2. To what extent will these individuals believe that your videotaped session is an accurate depiction of your true self?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
will believe	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	will not believe

3. How much do you think you would like these individuals?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
not at all	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	a lot

4. If you were given a chance to interact with these individuals at a later date, how much do you think they would like you?

	(1 st)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	
like	(2 nd)	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9	dislike

The following scales again concern your perceptions of the graduate students who will be viewing your taped sessions. Please circle the number that you feel best describes what you think the average individual in that group would be like.

warm	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	cold
incompetent	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	competent
supportive	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	not supportive
depressed	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	cheerful
likeable	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	not likeable
ugly	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	attractive
intelligent	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	stupid
friendly	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	aloof
distant	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	caring
expert	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	naive
simple	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	complex
helpful	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	harmful
evaluative	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	non-evaluative

(Behavioral Recall Task)

Think of some incidents that you feel are relevant to sociability. These may be occasions where you feel you were especially sociable, average, or especially unsociable. Briefly describe these incidents in the space below (you may continue on the back of the sheet). You don't have to go into any detail, just a sentence or two about each incident. Next to your description of each incident, indicate on a scale of 1-7 how sociable you were. If you feel you were extremely sociable in the situation you describe, score it as 1; moderately sociable - 2; slightly sociable - 3; neither sociable nor unsociable - 4; slightly unsociable - 5; moderately unsociable - 6; extremely unsociable - 7. Please list and rate 5 incidents.

APPENDIX D DEBRIEFING

Let me tell you a little bit more about the research project in which you participated. Everyone has had the experience of having a particularly good or bad day and, as a result, thinking about himself or herself in a way that is especially good or bad. In some cases, we may not only think about ourselves in these ways, but also describe ourselves to others in these ways, that is, more positively or more negatively than we might normally feel. Although this is a common experience, psychologists have relatively little information about how it might influence our self-beliefs, our self-esteem, our moods, our perceptions of others, and so forth. For example, does thinking about ourselves in an especially good or bad way produce any change in our self-beliefs or our self-esteem? Are there special conditions under which changes are most likely to occur? These questions are not only interesting in terms of increasing our knowledge about how our self-perceptions are formed and modified, they are also important in the sense that the answers may be very useful in clinical or counseling settings. Knowledge in this area could be put to use to design techniques to help people with negative self-images.

As you've probably guessed by now, our focus in this project was not solely on interviewing techniques and the training of

graduate students. In fact, the tape we have made today will be erased at the end of this session and will not be shown to anyone. We are primarily looking at how people's thoughts about themselves might influence their self-appraisals and moods. This is the reason we asked you to imagine yourself as feeling very sociable or very unsociable and to play that role.

We are sorry that it was necessary to withhold some of this information about the study until now. I'm sure you can understand, however, that if we told you at the start of the session we were partially interested in how your thoughts about yourself, as created by the role we assigned, might influence your self-perceptions, it probably would have caused you to behave unnaturally or at least differently and the results would be useless.

We would like you to agree to keep the actual purpose of our study a secret until the end of the semester, so that other students who might participate will not have this extra information. It is important that the people who participate do not know the actual purpose. If they did, our results would be worthless, since these people probably would behave differently than they otherwise would have. Thus, we'd greatly appreciate it if you would agree not to discuss the study with anyone until the end of the semester. I cannot stress enough the importance of this. Do you agree to help us out? (Wait for a response.)

FOR THE NEGATIVE SELF-PRESENTATION CONDITIONS ONLY:

We would like you to be aware that it is at least possible that your statements about yourself during the interview could have some carry-over effect. For example, if you feel a bit down later in

the day, it may merely be due to the fact that you played an unsociable role during our experiment. Thus, don't take it personally, but keep in mind that it may simply be a mild carry-over. Of course, we don't expect everyone to be affected in this way, and most participants will probably show little if any effect. But we thought it was worth mentioning.

We would like to thank you for your cooperation. If you have any questions, I'll be glad to answer them. If not, that's it. Thanks again.

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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